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This paper examines the changing attitudes of Gallo-Romans from the time of Caesar's conquest in the 
50s BCE to the start of Vespasian's reign in 70-71 CE and how Roman prejudice shaped those attitudes. I 
first examine the conflicted opinions of the Gauls in Caesar's time and how they eventually banded 
together against him but were defeated. Next, the activities of each Julio-Claudian emperor are 
examined to see how they impacted Gaul and what the Gallo-Roman response was. Throughout this 
period there is clear evidence of increased Romanisation amongst the Gauls and the prominence of the 
region is obvious in imperial policy. This changes with Nero's reign where Vindex's rebellion against the 
emperor highlights the prejudices still effecting Roman attitudes. This only becomes worse in the 
rebellion of Civilis the next year. After these revolts, the Gallo-Romans appear to retreat from imperial 
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 What were the Gallo-Roman attitudes towards the Romans and how did Roman prejudice shape 
the history of Roman Gaul? Those are the key question that this paper seeks to answer. Over the course 
of this paper, we will examine the interactions between Romans and Gauls during what may be roughly 
called the early empire: from Julius Caesar to the events immediately following Nero's death. Each 
Roman leader will have his own chapter and the events that are crucial for understanding Gallo-Roman 
attitudes will be examined for each of them. Under Julius Caesar these were the careers of Divitiacus 
and Dumnorix and the rebellions of Ambiorix and Vercingetorix; Augustus dealt with the administration 
and Romanization of the newly conquered Gallic provinces; Tiberius faced the unauthorized campaigns 
of Germanicus following the Rhine mutinies and the rebellion of Florus and Sacrovir; Caligula spent a 
year in Gaul, leading campaigns and selling imperial goods; Claudius launched his invasion of Britain 
from Gaul, acted as a grand patron of the province, and brought Gallo-Romans into the senate; Nero 
found Gaul tarred during the Great Fire and faced Vindex's revolt; the year of the four emperors saw 
chaos and the rebellion of Civilis. We then examine the aftermath of Nero's reign and the strife that 
followed and finish with an examination of the druids. Roman prejudice will be documented throughout 
as well as the Gallo-Roman response, where available. Gradual shifts are more apparent than immediate 
changes, as shall become clear as we get further into Gallo-Roman history. 
A note must be made on the sources for this paper. For most Roman and Greek authors, Gaul 
was not a priority so information must be gleaned wherever possible. Multiple sources, providing they 
exist, are used for any single event in order to provide an accurate picture of what occurred but in 
several cases other sources are unavailable or add nothing. For example, I use Caesar's account almost 
exclusively to document his activities in Gaul because he has the most detailed account and subsequent 
authors used him as their source. I have attempted to view these events with as much objectivity as 
possible, generally accepting the facts as portrayed but always questioning the motivations ascribed. 
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Again, as an example, Caesar was, of course, trying to legitimize his invasion of Gaul and had a vested 
interest in making himself look good. In some ways, the actual motivations do not necessarily matter, or 
at least they are not as important as the perceived motivations. The focus is, after all, on the attitudes of 
both the Gauls and the Romans toward each other. When a Roman (or Romanized Greek) author 
supplies a motivation that does not appear correct, that can say a great deal about what their outlook 
was towards the Gallo-Romans. The issues with the sources will be discussed as they occur throughout 
the paper and the flaws with the authors' accounts will be pointed out in the narrative. 
The relationship between the Gauls and Romans was always a rocky one. The first recorded 
interaction between these two peoples is a semi-mythologized Gallic attack on Rome that culminates in 
the sack of the city, the last time an invading force would manage that feat for over eight hundred years. 
Aside from this traumatic (for the Romans) event, the next few centuries saw Rome at war with various 
Gallic peoples more than peace or alliance with them. From the Gallic Wars in Italy to the Galatian War 
in Asia Minor, conflict was the most common way for the two cultures to cross paths. Not helping 
matters was the close, if also conflicted, relationship between Rome and Greece, which had its own 
troubled history with the Galatians from the looting of Delphi to the propaganda of victory against 
Galatians invoked by many Hellenistic monarchs. With this in mind, it is easy to see why the Romans 
would remain prejudiced towards the Gauls, even after they ceased to be a credible threat to the city or 
even Italy. Much has been said about this Roman outlook, summed up in the phrase terror Gallicus (or 
metus Gallicus), a fear and hatred of the Gauls which steered or sometimes outright poisoned Roman 
relations with their northern neighbours.   
 Before we examine the events under Caesar and his heirs, I want to discuss a bit of the earlier 
attitudes of the Romans towards the Gauls before the conquest of Gaul. Both the Roman and Greek 
authors write about the Gauls after experiencing Gallic attacks. For the Romans, this was the sack of 390 
3 
 
BCE by Brennus and his Gauls. Livy, though writing well after the event and Caesar's conquest of Gaul, 
captures the terror and destruction of this attack.1 There are clear mythological elements to the account 
but what matters is that it had stuck with the Romans until at least Livy's time and still concerned them.2 
The Greeks had a similarly traumatic experience with the attack of another Brennus and his Gauls on 
Greece in 279 BCE. Pausanias records the attack and describes a very similar reaction to the Gauls as 
what Livy writes later.3 The Greeks were defeated at Thermopylae and Delphi itself came under threat 
before the Gauls were defeated. The stories share a lot of elements: the terror caused by these invading 
barbarians, the destruction they left in their wake, the eventual victory bringing the community 
together, even the name of the Gallic leader. It is entirely possible that while a real attack on Rome by 
the Gauls took place, the tradition was strongly influenced by the Greek tradition stemming from the 
attack on Delphi. 
 There is also the tradition of victory propaganda against the Galatians that was used by various 
Hellenistic monarchs.4 A splinter group of Galatians from the same army that had attacked Delphi had 
made their way into Asia minor as mercenaries. The Galatians soon struck out on their own and carved 
out a territory for themselves in the central plateaus of Asia Minor. From these bases they continued to 
act as bandits and mercenaries throughout the Hellenistic Age, sometimes allied with Hellenistic kings, 
other times at war with them but never taken over until Augustus' time.5 Victory over the Galatians 
became a way of legitimizing the rule of a Hellenistic monarch styled after the victory of the Aitolians at 
                                                          
1
 Livy 5.38-55. Kremer (1994) 62-68 and Ruggini (1987) 191-2 note this metus Gallicus and how it carries through 
Livy's narrative. Rosenberger (2003) attempts to downplay the significance of this defeat but even he admits that 
there was a later metus Gallicus even if it didn't immediately follow the actual defeat.  
2
 As shall be seen later, it was still well remembered under the empire after Livy. 
3
 Paus. 10.19.5-10.23.14. 
4
 While Galatians tends to refer to those Gallic peoples who moved into central Asia Minor and Gauls for those 
living in Europe and this is how I am using these terms, they are not always used in this way by ancient or modern 
authors. Gauls, Galatians, and even Celts can all refer to the same peoples who share a language and cultural 
traits. 
5
 Coskun (2013) 74. 
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Delphi and especially the "elephant victory" of King Antiochus I of the Seleucid Empire.6 These victories, 
as well as those that followed, were celebrated on coins, in panegyric poems, through sculptures, and 
cult rituals for the kings who had 'saved' Greek civilization from the 'barbaric' Galatians. The Attalids of 
Pergamum produced the most prominent of these monuments after Attalos I's victories over the 
Galatians from 240 BCE onwards. The famed "Dying Galatian" and "Galatian Killing His Wife and Himself" 
are monuments erected by Attalos and, crucially, made into Roman copies.7 These monuments and 
other reminders of victory over the Galatians (or Keltenseig to use Strobel's term) made the Galatians 
into the barbarians of the Hellenistic Age and thus created a stereotype of the savage Gaul.8 Such 
prejudices were picked up by the Romans during their Gallic Wars of the third and second centuries BCE 
and carried forward throughout the history of Gallo-Roman relations.9 
More contemporaneous to Caesar, the surviving sources on Gaul are largely Greek.10 The 
earliest account is from Polybius, writing in the second century BCE, and covering the rise of Roman 
power in the Mediterranean. Polybius writes a narrative on the wars Rome fought and includes details 
on the Gauls when they are involved, notably in the Gallic Wars of the third and second centuries and 
during Hannibal's invasion where a number of Gallic tribes joined the Carthaginians. Most of Polybius' 
comments are quite negative and reflect the stereotypes of the savage Gauls. He writes about the 
Roman wars with the Gauls and mentions the untrustworthiness and greed of the Gauls, stealing booty 
from their allies and slaying prisoners even after they had been ransomed.11 He even explicitly ties 
Rome's wars with Gauls with the attack on Delphi, saying that all Gauls alike were afflicted with a sort of 
                                                          
6
 Coskun (2013) 75-77. The actual existence of the latter "elephant victory" is called into question by Coskun (2012) 
but the propaganda behind it still stands. 
7
 Coskun (2013) 77. 
8
 Strobel (1994), Coskun (2013) 78. 
9
 Coskun (2013) 78. 
10
 While the Latin annalists, such as Fabius Pictor, certainly would have written about the Gallic Wars and likely 
served as sources for later authors, such as Livy, they only survive in fragments, none of which provide any useful 
information on Rome's attitudes towards the Gauls. 
11
 Polyb. 2.7.5-6, 2.19. 
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epidemic of war.12 Gallic fickleness is also a running theme throughout his account, making all those who 
allied with the Gauls (Romans, Carthaginians, etc) wary of trusting them with any important tasks.13 In 
his account of Hannibal's invasion of Italy, Gallic hatred of Rome is stressed by Polybius as well, 
stemming from their defeat during the Gallic Wars.14 In fact, the Gauls feared expulsion or 
extermination by the Romans in much the same way the Romans feared it at Gallic hands.15 Their size 
and ferocity in battle made them tough opponents for Rome and highlighted the threat they posed.16 
Polybius' account paints a frightening picture of the Gauls, particularly since he was writing not long 
after the wars had ended.17 Gruen describes Polybius' comments as a mix of contempt, fear, and 
respect, a good summation of Mediterranean attitudes towards Gauls in general at the time.18 
The next Greek author we know of to discuss the Gauls is Posidonius but unfortunately his 
account has not survived. We know that he wrote about them from Diodorus and Strabo who both cite 
Posidonius as their source for the Gauls. As such, even though they were writing after Caesar's 
conquest, their accounts reflect the earlier tradition on the Gauls.19 Diodorus' overall description is not 
favourable: Gauls are fearsome in appearance, harsh and deceptive in conversation, boastful and 
threatening, disparaging of others, and overblown in their language.20 Diodorus writes on the Gallic 
fondness for wine and gold, both of which cause the Gauls to behave in an uncivilized fashion.21 Like 
                                                          
12
 Polyb. 2.20.7. 
13
 Polyb. 2.19.4, 2.32.7-8, 3.70.4, 3.78.2. 
14
 Polyb. 3.34.2, 3.78.5. 
15
 Polyb. 2.21.9. Not without cause, as most of the wars with the Gauls in Italy were invasions by Rome rather than 
the other way around. 
16
 Polyb 2.15.7, 2.29.5. 
17
 Gruen (2011) 142. 
18
 Gruen (2011) 142. 
19
 Gruen (2011) 143. 
20
 Diod. 5.31.1. Gruen (2011) 143-4 attempts to spin Diodorus' account into a more favourable outlook but even at 
the best of times, Diodorus is merely objective, recounting the information without passing judgement. This 
opening description of the Gauls certainly does not fit into an account free of polemic.  
21
 Diod. 5.26.3, 5.27.4, Gruen (2011) 143. 
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Polybius, he describes the size of the Gauls, tall and muscular, intimidating to Greeks and Romans.22 He 
also describes their practice of collecting the heads of slain enemies and displaying them tied to the 
Gaul's horse or even in their homes, a practice he calls bestial.23 The practice of human sacrifice is also 
detailed which Diodorus condemns as impious and savage.24 Diodorus also explicitly links the sack of 
Rome and the plunder of Delphi, mentioning them side by side in his list of Gallic attacks on the 
Mediterranean world.25 He finishes his description of the Gauls with the claim that male Gauls lust after 
each other rather than their own wives and see no harm to their dignity in prostituting themselves to 
each other.26 Overall, Diodorus gives a very negative view of the Gauls providing an idea of what 
Romans contemporary to Caesar would have thought of the Gallic peoples.27 
Strabo is the other near contemporary of Caesar who uses Posidonius as his source and reflects 
both the attitudes before the conquest and shortly thereafter.28 He describes the Gauls as a very 
bellicose people, very easy to provoke, but otherwise not ill mannered.29 Like the other Greek authors, 
he comments on their great size and ferocity, describing all of them as fighters by nature.30 He also 
comments on the collecting of heads and human sacrifice, the former he refers to as barbarous and 
alien.31 Overall, Strabo's account on the Gauls is nowhere near as harsh as Diodorus or Polybius.32 This 
may reflect the fact that the Gauls were fully conquered at the time of his writing so even though he 
                                                          
22
 Diod. 5.28.1-3. 
23
 Diod. 5.29.4-5. 
24
 Diod. 5.31.3-4, 5.32.6. 
25
 Diod. 5.32.5. 
26
 Diod. 5.32.7. Gruen (2011) notes that this is an almost gratuitous appendix to Diodorus' account and a striking 
final image to leave with a reader.  
27
 Even Gruen (2011) 145 admits that there is a good deal of fodder for those who want to read condemnation in 
the account. 
28
 Gruen (2011) 145. 
29
 Strabo Geogr. 4.4.2. 
30
 Strabo Geogr. 4.4.2. 
31
 Strabo Geogr. 4.4.5. 
32
 Gruen (2011) 145 claims that it is free from judgement but Strabo's comment on the collecting of heads shows 
at least some judgement being passed. 
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used Posidonius' account, many of the more "barbarous" practices, such as human sacrifice, had already 
been discontinued. 
Turning to the Latin authors, we only have two before Caesar's commentaries on his invasion: 
Cato the Elder and Cicero. Cato's only remark comes from a fragment of his Origines which makes the 
sweeping statement that all Gauls pursue two things most assiduously: the art of war and speaking with 
wit.33 This is all that we have from the famous statesman on the Gauls but it is notable that their warlike 
tendencies are once again highlighted.34  
Cicero, on the other hand, gives us a more thorough look at Roman attitudes towards the Gauls 
shortly before Caesar's invasion. Most of these views are recorded in one of Cicero's speeches, 
successfully defending M. Fonteius, who was accused of extortion and oppression of the Gauls while he 
was governor of Gallia Transalpina.35 The text is filled with Roman prejudice against the Gauls. While 
Cicero is no doubt exaggerating for rhetorical effect, the fact that his attacks on the Gauls giving 
evidence against Fonteius worked says a lot about Roman attitudes at the time. Cicero questions 
whether the Gauls know what it means to give evidence under oath, whether they treat it with the same 
respect and dignity as the Romans do.36 The boldness of the Gallic speakers prove that they are not 
worried about their reputations and that they are willing to lie under oath as opposed to the Romans 
who are nervous under questioning.37 Cicero condemns the practice of human sacrifice, questioning 
whether any Gaul can be trusted to keep an oath when they profane the gods by murdering men in their 
name.38 He launches into a diatribe comparing the Gauls accusing Fonteius and the Roman citizens who 
supported him (naturally enough since it was the Gauls who were robbed, not the Romans) asking if the 
                                                          
33
 Cato Orig. F2.3, Gruen (2011) 146. 
34
 Gruen (2011) 146. 
35
 Cic. Font., Gruen (2011) 146. For more on the historical context, see Coskun (2006). 
36
 Cic. Font. 27-30, Gruen (2011) 147. 
37
 Cic. Font. 28. 
38
 Cic. Font.31. 
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judges will prefer "strangers to people whom you know, unjust men to just ones, foreigners to 
countrymen, covetous men to moderate ones, mercenary men to disinterested ones, impious men to 
conscientious ones, men who are the greatest enemies to our dominions and to our name, to good and 
loyal allies and citizens?"39 Cicero's rhetoric about the trustworthiness of the Gauls as witnesses is 
especially flagrant because a few years later he employs members of the same tribe, the Allobroges, as 
trustworthy witnesses against Cataline.40 He even implies that the witnesses threatened the judges with 
another Gallic war should they side with Fonteius.41 From there he expands on his comparison of this 
trial with a Gallic war, noting the eagerness of the Romans to come to Fonteius' aid and the danger 
posed by showing weakness to the Gauls, a people who are the most hostile, savage, implacable, and 
cruel of all of Rome's enemies.42 He also reminds the judges of the attack on Delphi and the sack of 
Rome by the Gauls, once again tying those two events together and showing that these events were still 
well remembered centuries afterwards.43 Once again, note that this defence worked. Cicero does not 
bother to deny Fonteius' crimes, only that the Gauls cannot be shown weakness or the Roman hold on 
Gallia Transalpina was in danger.  
Having examined the Roman perspective leading up to Caesar's invasion, we have a better 
understanding of what the Gauls could expect when the Romans moved deeper into their territory. As 
you can see, Roman prejudice against the Gauls was alive and well before Caesar's invasion and would 
affect Gallo-Roman relations during his conquest and afterwards. 
  
                                                          
39
 Cic. Font. 32, Vasaly (1993) 194, DeWitt (1942) 399-400. 
40
 Cic. Cat. 4.5. cf. Sallust Cat. 50.1, Gruen (2011) 147. 
41
 Cic. Font. 33, Vasaly (1993) 193, Gruen (2011) 147. 
42
 Cic. Font. 41, 43. The entire comparison runs from 33-49. 
43




 The wealth of information provided by Julius Caesar's own account of his conquest of Gaul 
presents both an opportunity and a problem. The opportunity is that for the only time in Gallo-Roman 
history, we have a nearly complete account of a very important decade that can shed a good deal of 
light on the attitudes of both sides. The problem is that if these events were to be examined as closely 
as later ones, this section would dominate the account, lending it an undue weight compared to the rest 
of the period under scrutiny. As well, since no other significant account of the Gallic Wars exist (Dio's 
rendition adds little to Caesar's own, and likely uses the former as his source) we are very dependent on 
one viewpoint that had good reasons to stretch the truth.44 The commentaries were explicitly written to 
gain support for Caesar's actions among both the senate and the people of Rome and it is easy to be 
drawn into his view of events without considering the other side's views.45 That said, Caesar is a very 
detailed writer and the actual facts of the war are generally accepted aside from some of the numbers 
involved but that is common amongst ancient writers.46 The main issue is Caesar's perceived placidity. 
When reading his account it would be easy to think that the Romans were drawn into Gaul against their 
wishes, merely seeking to stabilize and police the region to keep it safe for them and their allies. Caesar 
would never have gone as far as he did if this were the case. As long as Caesar's agenda is kept in mind, 
the rest of his account can be accepted as accurate.47 This chapter will offer a limited look at the 
conquest focusing first on a pair of Aeduan brothers, Divitiacus (also seen as Diviciacus) and Dumnorix, 
who espoused opposing views towards the Romans, followed by the later resistance movements of 
Ambiorix and especially Vercingetorix.48 Unlike the following chapters, this one will include a good deal 
                                                          
44
 Chadwick (1997) 104. 
45
 Osgood (2009) 339-41. 
46
 Dyson (1968) makes a good argument for treating Caesar with caution but considering his information as mostly 
reliable. 
47
 See Drinkwater (1983) 16-17. 
48
 These resistance movements could be considered "rebellions" in that Caesar had essentially conquered Gaul by 
this point, with the tribes largely subjugated by or allied to the Romans. 
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of the narrative as it helps establish what events were compelling the actions of the Gauls and we have a 
rich enough source to reconstruct the circumstances. This will allow the examination of changing views 
of the Gauls without placing an undue amount of importance on the time period.  
 The seeds for the invasion of Gaul by Caesar were laid over a decade before during a struggle 
between two rival Gallic tribes, the Aedui and the Sequani. The Aedui were the strongest Roman allies 
within Gaul before Caesar's invasion. They had been styled both fratres and consanguinei by the senate 
as a sign of their close affiliation.49 As such, it is not surprising that after the king of the Germanic Suebi, 
Ariovistus, was invited into Gaul by the Sequani in 71 BCE and subsequently defeated the Aedui, the 
latter would turn to Rome for help.50 According to Caesar, Divitiacus, a noble from the Aedui, was able 
to escape his territory after his tribe was defeated by Ariovistus without swearing a loyalty oath or giving 
hostages to the Germanic king.51 Due to this, he alone was able to make it to Rome and stand before the 
senate to plead his case.52 During this mission, he evidently stayed with Cicero's brother and became 
friends to both of them.53 Despite his eloquent words and personal ties to leading Roman politicians, 
Divitiacus failed in his mission. Ariovistus, rather than attacked or humbled by the Romans, was named 
rex atque amicus by the senate in 59 BCE, when Caesar held the consulship.54 As such, Ariovistus would 
remain in place for some time, until another request for aid would bring Caesar into Gaul.  
                                                          
49
 Ceasar Gal. 1.33. The section does not say what these were awarded for but given their proximity to Gallia 
Narbonensis, it is likely that they sided with the Romans against other Gallic tribes who had attacked them, such as 
the Sequani, their neighbours and rivals.  
50
 Caes. Gal. 1.31. The failure of Rome to aid their allies could only have been a blow to their credibility in the 
region, see Drinkwater (1983) 13, Freeman (2008) 124. 
51
 Caes. Gal. 1.31.  
52
 Caes. Gal. 1.31 This event is also recorded in a 4
th
 century panegyric by an unknown author who says Divitiacus 
"informed [the Senate] of the situation, and when invited to sit with it, claimed less for himself than was conceded 
and gave his whole speech leaning on his shield." (Pan. Lat. 5.3.2, Nixon and Rodgers (1994) 269) See Chadwick 
(1997) 103-4 and Galletier (1952) vol 2 91f.  
53
 Cic. Div. 1.41. Curiously, Cicero does not mention his political purpose in the visit but does state that Divitiacus 
was a druid, who knew of natural philosophy and predicting the future. At no point does Caesar say that Divitiacus 
was a druid. For more on this see chapter 9.  
54
 Caes. Gal. 1.35. This would later prove to be a bit embarrassing for Caesar as Ariovistus would soon become one 
of Caesar's chief opponents in Gaul.  
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 This request would come after Orgetorix, a leading aristocrat among the Helvetii, made a pact 
with Casticus of the Sequani and Dumnorix of the Aedui to seize control of their respective tribes with 
the help of the others and through their alliance, dominate and unite all of Gaul.55 Dumnorix was the 
brother of Divitiacus but the two would be at odds through the next few years as each dealt with the 
Romans in different ways.56 Although Orgetorix would soon commit suicide when his scheme was 
revealed to the Helvetii, his tribe still resolved to go through with part of his plan to leave their current 
territory for larger, richer lands.57 This migration did not go well, since even after they obtained 
permission to pass through Sequani and Aeduan territory (brokered by Dumnorix), they ravaged the 
land, prompting the other tribes to go to Caesar for help.58 Thus Caesar was able to present his reason 
for invading Gaul as a preventative measure to stop the unification of all the Gallic tribes into an empire 
hostile to Rome.59 
Caesar moved in against the Helvetii but his progress was hampered by a lack of supplies, 
particularly the grain which the Aedui had promised him. Compounding this issue was a defeat suffered 
by the allied cavalry, chiefly Aeduan, against a small band of the Helvetii. This had emboldened the latter 
while dismaying Caesar's forces.60 When this need had become quite dire, he called the leaders of the 
Aedui before him, Liscus and Divitiacus, and reprimanded them for the lack of aid their tribe was 
providing when they had asked him to undertake the war in the first place.61 Shamed by this speech, 
Liscus revealed to Caesar that Dumnorix was sabotaging the Roman war effort. He was the one who had 
                                                          
55
 Caes. Gal. 1.2-3. These three groups represented the most powerful Gallic tribes of the time and Orgetorix likely 
offered Helvetii military support to the other two, see Goldsworthy (2006) 206. The comparison between these 
three Gauls and the first triumvirate is clear, both made a pact to control their respective states that was outside 
of normal procedures, Freeman (2008) 117. 
56
 Caes. Gal. 1.3.  
57
 Caes. Gal. 1.4-5. 
58
 Caes. Gal. 1.9-11. Dumnorix was attempting to move the Helvetii into Roman territory in Gallia Narbonensis in 
an attempt to weaken the Romans in the region and increase his own prestige by forging the deal between the 
Helvetii and Sequani, Freeman (2008) 123. Cf. Caes. Gal. 1.19; Goldsworthy (2006) 211. 
59
 Gardner (1983) 183.  
60
 Caes. Gal. 1.15. 
61
 Caes. Gal. 1.16.  
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brokered the deal giving the Helvetii passage in the first place and was even now spying on Caesar for 
them.62 Through his connections, Dumnorix was deterring the Aedui from providing the Romans with 
grain, saying that it would be better for them to be under a Gallic overlord than a Roman one. He also 
had a band of cavalry loyal to him personally, which had precipitated the defeat by the small band of 
Helvetii.63 He was in command of all the Aeduan cavalry so when they had turned and fled it dismayed 
the others and caused them to withdraw as well. Dumnorix was said to hate both Caesar and the 
Romans because they had disrupted his attempt to gain control of all Gaul and because their continued 
presence would weaken the power he had already amassed.64 Liscus had kept quiet about this treachery 
for so long because he feared what would happen to him if he revealed the truth, showing just how far-
reaching Dumnorix's power could be.65  
This clear anti-Roman bias was obviously not shared by Liscus nor even by a majority of the 
Aedui, since the tribe itself was officially on the side of the Romans and from Caesar himself, we hear 
that it was not shared by Divitiacus, whom he writes of as having a very high regard for the Roman 
people and Caesar himself.66 Due to this, despite Caesar's inclination to punish Dumnorix severely, he 
first went to Divitiacus to ask him to allow Dumnorix to be brought for judgement before either Caesar 
himself or the Aedui. Divitiacus embraced Caesar and wept, saying the he had helped bring his brother 
to power and that the latter's popularity exceeded his own, not only amongst the Aedui but throughout 
Gaul.67 Any censure of Dumnorix would alienate Divitiacus from the Gallic people since it was known 
                                                          
62
 Caes. Gal. 1.17-19. 
63
 As Freeman (2008) 126 notes, this had worked perfectly to embolden the Helvetii. 
64
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that he enjoyed the friendship of Caesar and would have consented to the punishment.68 With his 
brother pleading on his behalf, Dumnorix was pardoned by Caesar, although he did set spies on the 
wayward brother to ensure his future good behaviour.69 Whether Dumnorix had any intention of 
remaining loyal or not (his later actions would suggest not), he was soon no longer an issue because a 
few days after this confrontation Caesar defeated the Helvetii in a hard-won victory that showed the 
power of Roman arms against traditional Gallic forces. Though it took all day, the Romans wore down a 
far larger Gallic force, inflicting massive casualties and causing the whole tribe to surrender. Dumnorix's 
vision of using the Helvetii to further his own ambitions was dashed to pieces. One of the most powerful 
Gallic tribes had been humbled by the Romans.  
At this point, Dumnorix fades into the background for a while as the pro-Roman factions rose to 
prominence in the wake of the victory over the Helvetii. Divitiacus, as the leading figure of this faction, 
took centre stage, attempting to fulfill the mission he had failed in earlier: bringing Roman aid against 
Ariovistus.70 Caesar writes that Divitiacus and other Gallic chiefs of state came to him to ask for aid in 
secret and that Divitiacus spoke for them, detailing the ravages of Ariovistus, not only on the Aedui but 
even more so on their erstwhile allies, the Sequani, in whose territory the Germans had settled.71 
Divitiacus cleverly played off Roman fears by claiming that all the Gauls would have to follow in the 
footsteps of the Helvetii and emigrate away from the Germans and into Roman territory for protection. 
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Worse yet, with the Gauls removed, the Romans would have to face the Germans on their own.72 
Divitiacus even spoke for the Sequani, ostensibly his tribe's rivals, when they remained silent rather than 
urge Caesar to aid them. The Aeduan claimed that the Sequani could not talk of resistance or aid 
without fear of Ariovistus, since even escape was denied to them with the Germans holding all of their 
towns.73 This request for aid shows what was a major factor for pro-Roman Gauls: the threat of the 
Germans. Dumnorix's resistance showed that some Gauls feared that the Romans would take over 
themselves, but for these Gallic supporters of Caesar that threat did not matter as much as getting out 
from under the heel of the Germans. Ariovistus had shown them just how dangerous the Germans could 
be and they preferred the risk of inviting the Romans to intercede over allowing the Germans to 
continue residing in Gaul. These arguments swayed Caesar into agreeing to help the Gauls against 
Ariovistus. He also thought it reflected badly on Rome that the Aedui, whom the senate had called both 
fratres and consanguineos, were held in thrall by Germans. Moreover, Ariovistus and his Germans 
represented a potential threat to not only Gaul but even Italy, as the Cimbri and Teutones had before.74 
Thus began Caesar's war against Ariovistus, although at first it involved far more diplomatic 
exchanges than actual fighting.75 Further Germanic incursions against the Aedui and the Treveri forced 
Caesar to hasten his confrontation with Ariovistus.76 While in Vesontio, reports of the size and ferocity 
of the Germans reached Caesar's troops and threw them into a panic. They refused to march through 
woods and bogs towards such a fearsome enemy.77 Caesar managed to assuage their fears by 
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downplaying the German threat, saying that the Gauls whom they had just defeated were able to secure 
victories against the Germans and that their ultimate victory was the result of cunning not valour.78 
While his stirring speech put confidence back into the legions, Caesar did not underestimate the 
Germans. He had Divitiacus, in whom he had the greatest faith among all the others, scout out a route 
to Ariovistus which passed through open territory, rather than the forests and swamps that would 
favour the Germans.79 The amount of trust that Caesar had placed in Divitiacus' hands was large. Since 
he was the one who had found the route, it would have been easy for him to betray it to Ariovistus, 
leading Caesar into an ambush instead of a safe passage. Yet the Aeduan remained loyal and Caesar's 
march prompted Ariovistus to attempt a parlay. The talks quickly broke down with Ariovistus demanding 
Caesar leave Gaul and Caesar, ironically enough, arguing on behalf of Gallic independence.80 In the 
battle that followed, Caesar defeated Ariovistus, driving him from Gaul and across the Rhine, from 
where he would not return.81 Divitiacus had finally succeeded in his mission to rid his lands of the threat 
posed by Ariovistus and his Suebi. The Aeduan had used his personal friendship and considerable 
rhetorical skills to convince Caesar to aid him and had proved invaluable in the course of the campaign. 
He would prove himself once more to Caesar the following year, when the Belgae rose against the 
Romans. 
Caesar learned that the Belgae tribes of northeastern Gaul were allying against him for many of 
the same reasons that were given to Dumnorix's treachery. They opposed the Roman presence in Gaul, 
not wanting to be subject to Rome with the leading men fearing even more so that Roman dominance 
would undermine their traditional power.82 This information is given to Caesar by ambassadors from the 
Remi, a Belgae tribe who wished to stand with the Romans rather than against them, once again 
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showing the divided nature of Gallic society at this point. Understanding the threat posed to his forces, 
Caesar raised two new legions and summoned his most trusted ally, Divitiacus. He asked the Aeduan to 
have his tribe invade the territory of the Bellovaci, the most powerful member of the Belgae alliance and 
a neighbour of the Aedui.83 Again, the trust shown in Divitiacus should be highlighted. Had he switched 
sides or even not launched his attack, Caesar's battles would have been far more difficult. Divitiacus 
once again came through for Caesar and at a key moment in the fighting between the Romans and 
Belgae, the Bellovaci learned that their territory was being ravaged by the Aedui. Needing to look after 
their own people, the Bellovaci withdrew, robbing the Belgae of their strongest contingent and 
essentially destroying the larger alliance.84 Caesar began to lead his army against the tribes, one by one, 
most of which surrendered.  
When he reached the Bellovaci, a stream of elderly men met him, pleading for clemency. 
Divitiacus also pleaded with Caesar to show mercy to the Bellovaci, who were often Aeduan allies, 
saying that they were deceived by leading men of their tribe who claimed that the Aedui were reduced 
to slavery under the Romans and if the Bellovaci wanted to avoid that fate, they would resist Rome with 
martial strength.85 This sounds eerily like Dumnorix's words in Belgae mouths and it would hardly be 
surprising if he had a hand in the Belgae uprising, although Caesar does not mention any involvement on 
his part. Another benefit of pardoning this group was the honour and prestige it would bestow on the 
Aedui and Divitiacus, the staunchest allies of the Romans thus far.86 The size and power of the Aedui, 
who were supporting Caesar, could be used as an advertisement of the benefits to friendship with 
Rome. Caesar was convinced by this, citing his respect for the Aedui and Divitiacus, and after the 
Bellovaci handed over 600 hostages and their weapons, he took them under his protection and 
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pardoned them.87 Once again, Divitiacus' considerable rhetorical skills were on display, convincing 
Caesar to show a great deal of clemency towards the Bellovaci. 
While the war with the Belgae would continue,88 Divitiacus would no longer play a role. In fact, 
he essentially disappears from the rest of Caesar's account, aside from a couple of offhand mentions 
that did not necessitate his continued presence. Since he had been so prominent, both in Caesar's 
account and amongst the Gauls in general, his disappearance likely means that the Aeduan statesman 
died some time shortly after securing the Bellovaci pardon. It is difficult to base a claim from a lack of 
evidence but considering how central he had been previously and that the Aedui would continue to play 
a key role in the Gallic wars, it is unlikely that Divitiacus simply faded into the background. Perhaps his 
rivalry with Dumnorix had finally caught up with him and his brother had assassinated him or he simply 
became ill and died.89 Whatever the case, one brother was gone but the other would come back once 
again to hamper Caesar's efforts in Gaul.  
The year after the Belgae were defeated saw Caesar mounting a similar campaign against the 
tribes of northwestern Gaul, along the Atlantic coast. They too had formed an anti-Roman coalition to 
resist "slavery under the Romans"90 and which Caesar crushed almost as quickly as he did the Belgae 
alliance, though their naval capabilities stymied Caesar at first.91 The following year, Caesar launched 
punitive raids into Germania, to dissuade the tribes from making any attacks across the Rhine. To 
accomplish this he built bridges across the Rhine across which he launched devastating attacks.92  
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Once the incursion into Germania was over, and with some of the campaigning season still 
remaining, Caesar launched a raid on Britain as well.93 This first raid was only a partial success at best so 
Caesar resolved to go back the next year with a more substantial force. Since he was taking so many 
troops from the continent, Caesar did not feel safe leaving troublesome Gallic aristocrats behind him, 
fearing that there might be an uprising when he was away. Considering that most of the northern tribes 
had tried to push the Romans out a few short years ago and that he had even now just prevented a 
potential uprising among the Treveri, it is not surprising that Caesar felt this way.94 Chief amongst these 
agitators was Dumnorix.95 Furthermore, he had made the false claim to the Aedui that Caesar had 
appointed him as leader of their tribe, which the Aedui had not dared to contradict for fear of upsetting 
Caesar if it proved true.96 While it is not mentioned at this juncture, it is possible that Caesar suspected 
Dumnorix of conspiring with the other resistance movements as well. The reasons for opposing the 
Romans all sounds very similar to those ascribed to Dumnorix and Caesar had previously mentioned his 
ties to nobility from tribes across Gaul.  
When Dumnorix was told that he was to accompany Caesar to Britain, he asked to remain in 
Gaul instead, first due to a fear of the sea and second because of religious responsibilities.97 When this 
did not work, he attempted to stir up the other Gallic chieftains who were to accompany Caesar to Gaul, 
beseeching them to remain in Gaul as well. He claimed that Caesar was taking such an assemblage of 
Gallic nobility for no idle reason but to kill them all away from Gaul, where he was more likely to get 
away with it.98 Evidently Dumnorix was not as skilled an orator as his brother because when the time 
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came to board the ships, the other Gauls remained at the embarkation site rather than attempting to 
slip away with him and the Aeduan cavalry.99 When he learned of this, Caesar sent a force of cavalry to 
bring Dumnorix and the Aeduan cavalry back but to kill him if he resisted. The men Caesar sent 
demanded he come with them but Dumnorix resisted, defending himself and imploring his compatriots 
to aid him, all the while exclaiming that he was free and subject of a free state.100 In a rather pitiful end, 
Dumnorix was cut down without any of the Aedui raising a hand to defend him, the cavalry all returned 
to Caesar.101 The killing of Dumnorix demonstrated to the Gauls that Caesar would only be pushed so far 
and even the most powerful Gallic noblemen were not safe from him.102 
Thus ended the careers of the Aeduan brothers who, in many ways, shared responsibility for 
Caesar's invasion of Gaul. Together they reflected the conflicted Gallic attitudes towards the Romans, at 
least among the upper classes.103 Some, particularly among the southern tribes that bordered on Roman 
territory, embraced the Romans as friends and allies and were personified by Divitiacus, who never 
wavered in his support of Rome.104 They no doubt realised that their tribes' independence would be 
subordinate to Rome's but it was better to profit from being loyal than to, in their view, pointlessly 
resist.105 Others dreaded the coming of Rome as a threat to their current hold on power and their 
freedom. These men, like Dumnorix, resisted Rome's intrusions either through subterfuge or open 
armed opposition.106 Divitiacus showed the importance of rhetoric amongst the Gauls, his speeches won 
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over Caesar on several occasions and raised his tribe's prominence.107 Without him and Gauls like him, 
Caesar would not have been successful in subduing the rest of the country or at least not as quickly. 
Dumnorix, meanwhile, was rather unsuccessful in his attempts to curb Roman power despite his best 
efforts. His treachery in the Helvetian campaign has been examined but there is another possible 
example of his resistance. The language used by the northern Gallic tribes in their resistance to Caesar 
seems very similar to Dumnorix's own rhetoric. His dying words sum it up well, freedom for the Gauls, 
freedom from Roman subjugation. This was not only part of his own message to the Aedui but it comes 
up with the Belgae and the tribes of Brittany.108 The Belgae even reference the Aedui specifically as 
being enslaved by the Romans. While this is common language of resistance, it is difficult not to see the 
hand of Dumnorix in the other uprisings, especially since Caesar himself notes that the Aeduan was 
popular throughout Gaul.109 Having gone through their stories, there is one very important caveat to 
highlight: the entire account is through Caesar's eyes. As noted at the beginning of the chapter, Caesar 
had reasons for lying or at least stretching the truth if it made him look better in the eyes of the 
Romans. The wholeheartedness of Divitiacus' support could be one of these stretches. Perhaps Caesar 
simply wanted to highlight the helpfulness of some of the Gauls. Alternatively, it could have been an act 
on Divitiacus' part. Perhaps he and his brother were working together to control both the pro- and anti-
Roman factions within Gaul. Dumnorix could have simply been a useful scapegoat to cover-up Caesar's 
mistakes in the early part of the Helvetian campaign. A grand conspiracy to invade Roman territory and 
unite all of Gaul would justify Caesar's involvement in the region far more than a simple migration of a 
tribe. All of these are possibilities that need to be kept in mind. However, it is also important to note 
that the biggest take away from this period, that Gallic views on the Romans were decidedly split, is not 
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invalidated even if Caesar's detail prove false. Clearly opinions in Gaul were mixed, but rebellion was 
brewing and would soon threaten Caesar's hold over Gaul. Had Dumnorix still been alive, it might have 
been his role to lead the Gauls against Caesar but with his death the floor was left open to Ambiorix and 
Vercingetorix.  
The first Gauls to truly revolt against Caesar and Rome were the Eburones, a relatively minor 
Belgic tribe whom Caesar had freed from the subjugation of a neighbouring tribe.110 The Eburones were 
lead by Ambiorix and Cativolcus, although the former clearly outshone the latter in the events that 
followed. Until the winter of 54 BCE, after the second British campaign, they were counted amongst the 
loyal tribes of Gaul. However, the harvest of that year proved very poor, leading Caesar to scatter his 
men in smaller camps spread through the territories of several Gallic tribes, the Eburones receiving one 
full legion and five cohorts led by Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta.111 Naturally, this caused 
widespread resentment since the harvest was poor for all of them, none could readily afford to feed 
Caesar's troops on top of their own people.112 On the fifteenth day since the Romans arrived at their 
winter quarters, Ambiorix launched an attack against the soldiers outside the camp and then besieged it 
as well, spurred on by a leader of the Treveri, Indutiomarus.113  
When a pair of Roman knights were sent to parlay with Ambiorix, he expressed his indebtedness 
to Caesar for freeing his tribe from tribute to their neighbours and returning the hostages, among them 
his own son, who had been kept by them.114 Ambiorix did not personally want to attack the Romans but 
his people did and he was bound to their wishes. Additionally, it was not his people alone who wanted 
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to attack the winter camps but all of Gaul had united to overthrow the Romans.115 He was aware that his 
own forces were not enough to withstand Caesar but he had been assured of a common resolution 
among the Gauls and German aid from across the Rhine would be arriving shortly.116 For the sake of the 
kindness Caesar showed his people, he would allow the Romans to withdraw to the relative safety of the 
camps of Quintus Cicero or Labienus before the German reinforcements arrived.117 This turned out to be 
a ruse, however, for when the Romans decided to retreat, they were ambushed by Ambiorix and 
severely battered.118 When Sabinus attempted to surrender and spare his men, Ambiorix had him cut 
down and spared no Romans who dropped their weapons.119 A few managed to fight their way back to 
the camp but committed suicide when they realised capture was imminent. Only a handful escaped and 
brought news of the revolt to Labienus.120 This was the first large scale defeat Caesar suffered in Gaul 
and it had been accomplished by a tribe with little prestige.121 
Ambiorix had played the Romans perfectly. While some, notably Cotta, thought he was lying 
when he offered safe passage, the majority were convinced that he had spoken as a friend of the 
Romans when he made the offer.122 He was clearly another gifted Gallic orator, as he went on to 
convince the Aduatuci, to whom the Eburones had recently been subjugated, and the Nervii, the tribe 
that had held out longest against the Romans during the Belgae resistance, to join in the revolt.123 
Ambiorix lead this coalition against Cicero's legion which was stationed in the Nervii territory. The Nervii 
leaders attempted the same bluff on Cicero that Ambiorix had used against Sabinus and Cotta, that they 
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could safely withdraw for the sake of friendship.124 Either Cicero was not as easily mislead or the Nervii 
leaders were not as convincing as Ambiorix, because the ruse failed and Cicero remained in his camp 
until he finally managed to sneak out a message to Caesar.125 When he heard of the attack, Caesar 
gathered two nearby legions, marched to Cicero's camp and managed to drive off the Gauls.  
Despite this victory, Ambiorix's success against the troops stationed in his territory had inspired 
fresh waves of anti-Roman sentiment and hope that armed resistance could succeed.126 Caesar himself 
writes that the only tribes he trusted to remain loyal were the Aedui, who had a long history of fidelity 
(Dumnorix notwithstanding), and the Remi, who had recently offered so much assistance during the 
fighting.127 Fortunately for him, no further tribes joined and Caesar and his lieutenants were able to put 
down in turn all those who had supported Ambiorix's revolt; the Nervii, Senones, Carnutes, Menapii, and 
Treveri were all brought to heel, forced to give hostages for their good behaviour, many of whom were 
held by the Aedui for the Romans.128 With his allies defeated, Ambiorix turned his entire people into a 
guerrilla army, scattering them among the many secret hiding places in the countryside.129 Caesar 
invited all the Eburones' neighbours to join him in plundering the territory in order to spare his troops. 
Aside from an unfortunate attack on Roman forces by a large band of German cavalry, this had the 
desired effect. Those Eburones not killed in the fighting died of starvation with the grain either being 
eaten by the marauding troops or left to spoil in the fields since it was not safe to try to harvest.130 
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Although Ambiorix escaped, his people did not and the Eburones were wiped from the map in a 
deliberate act by Caesar.131 
While Ambiorix's revolt had been put down in relatively short order, he had managed to damage 
severely Caesar's position within Gaul. Only the Eburones themselves proved to be much trouble and 
even then, only due to their guerrilla tactics. However, the precedent set by that first attack would be a 
problem for Caesar. Not only had an entire legion and five cohorts been wiped out but their destruction 
had raised the hope of Gallic partisans throughout the newly conquered territory.132 The Eburones did 
not have widespread support for their resistance to Rome prior to their attack. It was only after their 
victory that others began to flock to Ambiorix's banner and pose a serious challenge to Roman power in 
Gaul. Caesar's response showed how the Romans would deal with such treachery. While most of the 
other tribes received relatively light punishments, mostly being forced to give hostages, the Eburones 
were annihilated as a message to any other would-be rebels. Evidently this was not enough as Caesar's 
strongest opponent was about to rise and unite nearly all of Gaul behind him: Vercingetorix.133 
In 52 BCE, Caesar was in Cisalpine Gaul, raising new troops and worrying about the situation in 
Rome following the death of P. Clodius Pulcher.134 The Carnutes, who had taken part in Ambiorix's 
rebellion, heard the rumors of trouble in Rome and decided that Caesar would be too busy to return to 
Gaul, began another rebellion.135 They began by attacking a trading centre rather than a more military 
target, slaughtering the Roman citizens and plundering their property.136 The story of their success 
spread throughout Gaul, most importantly among the Averni and to Vercingetorix. He was an Avernian 
noble whose father had nearly become "king" of all the Gauls and who was excited at the prospect of 
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opposing Rome. The other leaders of his tribe believed taking up arms against the Romans to be foolish 
and kicked him out of Gergovia where he had been gathering supporters. Vercingetorix, however, was 
not done. He gathered an army from the lower classes and expelled those who had previously expelled 
him.137 Clearly the lower classes were not as welcoming of the Romans as the nobility. Vercingetorix 
then quickly sent out letters to the surrounding tribes, asking them to join him and received a warm 
response from many, pledging to join the rebellion and asking him to lead it.138 Crucially, this meant that 
the entire resistance had a central leadership, something no other Gallic alliance against Caesar had had 
before.139 Having gathered his army, Vercingetorix targeted the client tribes of the Aedui, forcing Caesar 
to come to their aid.140  
These initial conflicts between the Roman forces and the Gauls did not go well for Vercingetorix 
as Gallic infantry proved once again unable to withstand the legions in open battle but Caesar was still 
unable to crush the revolt quickly.141 Vercingetorix decided that scorched earth tactics were the only 
way to defeat the Romans, denying them all opportunities to forage.142 Remarkably, the Gauls agreed to 
the tactics, despite the fact that it was not Averni territory being destroyed, and set fire to twenty 
towns, only asking for Avaricum to be spared since it was one of the fairest cities in all Gaul.143 The 
battle for this city proved to be a disaster for both sides. When Caesar finally took the city after a siege, 
his men, stirred up by the massacre of Roman civilians at the start of the revolt, decided to pay the 
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Gauls back in kind.144 Forty thousand men, women, and children were slain by the legionnaires during 
the night.145 This was a severe loss for Vercingetorix but he played it to his advantage, using Roman 
brutality to bring over more tribes to his cause and his prior insistence that the town be abandoned to 
showcase his wisdom.146 While Caesar certainly must have realised what a public relations nightmare 
this sack would be, he likely did not envision just how bad it would become. 
Following the sack, Caesar moved into Averni territory and towards Gergovia, no doubt hoping 
to cut out the heart of the rebellion.147 Vercingetorix, meanwhile, was showing what an adept politician 
he was by turning to a group of Aeduan nobles whom he bribed to bring the tribe over to his side, 
against the Romans.148 This they managed to do by lying about a Roman massacre of their noblemen, 
panicking the people and driving them into the arms of the Averni willingly.149 This was essentially the 
terror Gallicus in reverse, with the Aedui terrified that the Romans were coming to slaughter them, a 
fear that was no doubt buoyed by the massacre of the Eburones and the town of Avaricum. Matters 
quickly got out of hand and the Aedui massacred the Roman citizens in their territory and plundered 
their property.150 Even those who did not take part in the attacks feared that they would be tarred with 
the same brush and thus the Aedui, Rome's staunchest allies since before Caesar's invasion, finally 
turned on the Romans completely, aside from some forces who were with Caesar himself and these 
would soon withdraw and join the rebels as well.151 Their defection illustrates how superficial support 
for the Romans could be. Given the right opportunity, even Rome's strongest supporters were evidently 
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willing to betray them. Caesar's defeat at Gergovia did not help matters and when he retreated it was a 
signal to the Gauls that they could have their freedom.152 
The Aedui and Vercingetorix set up a council to determine who should have overall command 
and how the rest of the war should be waged, with the Aedui attempting to take over.153 Caesar writes 
that this council was attended by representatives from all the Gallic tribes save three; the Remi and the 
Lingones remained loyal to Rome throughout the conflict and the Treveri were too occupied with 
Germanic incursions over the Rhine to help either side of the conflict.154 This was unprecedented, all the 
previous resistance movements were piecemeal and territorially linked whereas this was an alliance of 
practically all of Gaul.155 No rebellion that followed had such widespread support with the possible 
exception of the so-called "Gallic empire" of the late third century CE. The Gauls had come together to 
drive the Romans out and Vercingetorix was unanimously elected as the man to lead them.156  
Unfortunately for them, the revolt did not end up amounting to much. Once Caesar regrouped 
his forces, he was able to drive Vercingetorix into Alesia and besieged him within the town.157 
Vercingetorix had purposefully not assembled all the fighting men he could for want of any way to 
supply such a force but now that he was trapped, he sent out his cavalry to bring a relief army consisting 
of all the tribesmen of military age.158 This, of course, lead to the famous double fortifications around 
Alesia, both to keep Vercingetorix in and the relief army out. While the other Gauls declined to gather 
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every fighting man at their disposal, largely for logistical reasons,159 they did manage to assemble a force 
of 240,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry, according to Caesar.160 What they lacked, however, was another 
commander of Vercingetorix's caliber. The relieving army was defeated, though not destroyed 
completely, and forced to retreat.161 Seeing this and realising that further resistance was pointless, 
Vercingetorix surrendered.162 The Aedui soon followed suit and so on until all of Gaul was once again in 
Roman hands, where it would remain until the empire in the west fell some five centuries later.163 Aside 
from Vercingetorix himself, most of the surviving rebel leaders escaped punishment, with Caesar 
focussing on keeping Gaul in check now that it had been fully conquered.164 
Vercingetorix had accomplished what no other Gaul had been able to do: he created a pan-
Gallic alliance to oppose Rome, united under his leadership. There were no existing institutions for 
Vercingetorix to rely upon, only the sheer force of his personality held the coalition together.165 Gallic 
disunity had proven to be a huge boon to Caesar's invasion but Vercingetorix was largely able to 
overcome it after Gergovia.166 Yet this was still not enough to stop Rome. The Gauls learned that armed 
opposition to Rome was not feasible and central Gaul would remain peacefully under Roman control for 
decades to come. From this point, civil wars and affairs in the rest of the empire largely preoccupied 
Caesar and he did little to establish formally the Roman hold on Gaul. He established numerous colonies 
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in southern Gaul, most in the territory that the Romans had held for some time before his conquests. 
There is one, however, outside of this region which would come to be very important in later Roman 
Gaul, that of Lugdunum, modern-day Lyon. Under Caesar it was simply another Roman colony, well 
placed to hold back a Germanic incursion, but under his heirs it would become the unofficial capital of 
Gaul. This transformation would be helped most by the first emperor, Augustus.  
This period in Gallo-Roman history shows a great deal transition. When Caesar first arrived in 
Gaul, the region was dominated by a few larger tribes that largely fought amongst themselves. At the 
end of the war nearly all of Gaul stood united against Caesar and the Romans, an event that was 
unprecedented in recent Gallic memory. Even the larger tribes that had fought each other for 
dominance in Gaul put aside their differences to fight the Romans. Before Caesar's arrival, Germanic 
peoples had a strong foothold on the western bank of the Rhine and were the dominant force, 
subjugating even some of the larger Gallic tribes. By the time the wars ended the Germans had all but 
left Gaul and those remaining were employed as mercenaries by Caesar. Entire towns and even tribes 
were wiped off the map. The population dropped significantly during the war with countless Gauls 
either killed or taken as slaves. In short, Caesar turned all of Gaul upside down with his wars. This is 
important to keep in mind when examining what followed in Gallo-Roman history. After a decade of 
constant warfare and a grand final stand against Rome, Gaul was exhausted. Many of their leading men 
had been killed, crops had been destroyed, and towns laid waste. Many of those with the strongest anti-
Roman sentiments were gone, either killed, captured, or fled to Germania. The way of life for the Gauls 
had been significantly altered and there was a need for something to bridge the gap between the Gallic 






 Roman Gaul was transformed under the reign of Augustus from a newly conquered territory 
kept in check by the might of the Roman legions to provinces that, while not fully Romanised by any 
stretch, were well on their way to that goal. Unlike the other emperors that will be examined, there are 
few standout events during Augustus' reign which changed Roman Gaul, but rather a series of policies 
and military campaigns which showed just how much had changed since the conquest. Since most of 
these changes can be tied to the military issues of the times, they will be examined through that lens.  
 Caesar's conquest of Gaul was at once both a turning point and yet also left a remarkably small 
impact on some areas of Roman Gaul. The tribes remained in more or less the same configurations they 
had held shortly before the Roman conquest with the Averni and the Aedui still leading other tribes, 
despite their involvement with Vercingetorix's revolt.167 Caesar founded several colonies in southern 
Gaul, such as Narbo, Arelate, and Baeterrae but all but three of them were in the territory which Rome 
had held before his conquests.168 Even the three exceptions, Noviodunum, Lugdunum, and Raurica were 
all situated on the periphery and placed more to guard against Germanic incursions than to keep the 
Gauls in line.169 In fact, there seemed little need to police Gaul following Caesar's defeat of 
Vercingetorix. During the height of his stage of the civil wars, we hear of no Gallic uprisings, even when 
nearly all the Roman forces were tied up in the east, battling each other. This was most likely the result 
of a manpower shortage, with so many lost to the war with Caesar, combined with the more "hot-
headed" Gauls being given ample opportunity for battle with the different factions of the civil war. 
These young nobles that went to war with the Romans are the first that can really be called Gallo-
Romans rather than Gauls since they returned from the fighting wealthy, partially Romanised, and most 
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importantly, as Roman citizens themselves, taking the name of their patrons "Gaius Julius".170 These 
'Julii' Gauls would wield considerable influence over Roman Gaul for the remainder of the Julio-Claudian 
period, taking part in or even sparking all of the important Gallic events that followed.171 Before they 
could put this influence into practice, however, Roman politics changed with the death of Julius Caesar 
and the rise of his nephew and heir, Octavian.  
 During the civil wars, the governors of Gaul, including Marc Antony, were not concerned with 
any policy regarding the territory and instead focused on holding the region's resources for their side. As 
such, until 40 BCE, there is little, if any change in the state of Gallic affairs because the governors were 
more concerned with the affairs of the wider empire than their province.172 The change came about as a 
result of Octavian taking over the west in general and the following year both travelling to Gaul 
personally and appointing his most trusted lieutenant, Agrippa, as governor.173 This marks the beginning 
of the close connection that Augustus and, to one extent or another, the other Julio-Claudians had with 
Gaul. Many members of the imperial household spent a good deal of time within Gaul, as shall be seen. 
Meanwhile, Agrippa had to contend with Aquitanian tribes of the southwest and the north eastern 
tribes bordering the Rhine who were receiving German aid.174 He even crossed the Rhine to fight the 
Germans directly, something that only Caesar had previously done.175  
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It is likely that as part of his governorship, Agrippa began his Gallic roadways at this time as 
well.176 Strabo tells us that starting from Lugdunum, one road went west into Aquitania, one went to the 
coast on the north west, one went to the Rhine on the north east, and one went south to the 
Mediterranean coast. The military troubles in both Aquitania and the north east during his governorship 
would certainly provide a good military rationale for those roads. By placing Lugdunum at the centre, 
owing to its proximity to central Gaul, Agrippa magnified its status to a degree beyond that of other 
colonies, something that would be reinforced by later emperors and princes.  
Following Agrippa's governorship we have little detail on Gaul for some time although it seems 
that both the regions that gave him trouble, also rebelled under succeeding governors. The Morini and 
the Treveri rebelled with Germanic support sought and given in both cases in 30 and 29 BCE 
respectively.177 Furthermore, the Aquitanians revolted in 28 BCE a year after Octavian launched a 
campaign against the Iberian tribes of Spain.178 It was becoming clear that the Gauls on the periphery 
were not content to remain loyal Roman vassals, especially when support from their neighbours was 
available. The Germans were proving to be a very real problem for Roman control in Gaul. That said, the 
central regions seem to have been quiet throughout this period. Perhaps they were better represented 
amongst the young nobles who took part in the civil wars and became Roman citizens, thus tying their 
fortunes all the closer to Rome's. While the region was clearly receiving more military attention, it would 
soon see even greater administrative attention when Octavian himself, now Augustus, visited the 
province in 27 BCE.  
 Octavian travelled to Roman Gaul shortly after he became Augustus. It was, in fact, the first 
province he visited since taking the title, showing how important this region was to him. This is where 
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the first large-scale political reorganizations can be seen, most obviously, with the splitting of the 
provinces. Prior to this trip, all of Transalpine Gaul was ruled as a single province, a decidedly unwieldy 
arrangement with so much territory in question. As such, he first split the southern, heavily Romanised 
section away to form Gallia Narbonensis.179 This divide highlighted the differences between the two 
regions and why Narbonensis is largely excluded from this paper. For a further contrast, in 22 BCE the 
province was returned to senatorial control, indicating that occupying legions were not needed.180 The 
rest of the territory was divided into three provinces: Gallia Lugdunensis, Gallia Aquitania, and Gallia 
Belgica.181 For the first time the 'Three Gauls' truly exist. A census was also conducted at this time, 
possibly to assess the proper taxes from the new provinces. The Gauls had never before experienced a 
census so it is likely that Augustus chose to be on hand for it to reduce trouble.182 Furthermore, 
Augustus brought in more elements of the Mediterranean with the establishment of administrative 
centres for at least the larger tribes such as Augustodunum Aeduorum for the Aedui and Augusta 
Treverorum for the Treveri.183 These sites would become strongholds of Romanization within the Three 
Gauls with Augustodunum, for example, becoming a centre for Roman learning in the west. These 
efforts began the steady process of Romanization which began to take hold of Roman Gaul. The process 
would be sped along more in later years but it would take the spurring of the Germans for it to take 
hold.  
The hostility of the Germans went on for some time with the Roman response being limited to 
raids and punitive actions rather than conquest. The change came after the clades Lolliana of 16 BCE 
where an invading army of Germans destroyed the army lead by Lollius and even captured the standard 
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of the Fifth Legion.184 This loss spurred Augustus to act, journeying to Gaul himself for an extended visit 
from 16 to 13 BCE and putting first Tiberius and then Drusus in charge of the provinces and the response 
against the Germans.185 Aside from the change in Rome's German policy, these events are also notable 
for the lack of response from the Gauls. This would have been an ideal time to assert their 
independence once again with Rome's military strength in the region temporarily weakened. Yet there is 
no evidence for a Gallic rebellion at this time.186 There may have been an uprising a short time later but 
it was not the weakness of the legions which spurred it but a new census.  
In the periochae of Livy, there is a mention of a Gallic revolt caused by a census shortly before 
the Germanic campaign of Drusus began.187 This would make a certain amount of sense, since the 
Germanic campaign needed provisions to supply them and Gaul was the obvious place to get the 
materials from. This would also have likely been a larger taxation than the previous census due to the 
added expense and this time Augustus himself was not on hand to quell any unrest. Unfortunately, no 
other sources mention this revolt and Livy's actual account is lost so it is not possible to say how 
widespread the revolt was nor which tribes were involved.188 While the exact impact of the revolt is 
difficult to determine, it is interesting to note that the altar at Lugdunum was founded shortly 
thereafter.  
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In 12 BCE, Drusus instituted the worship of Rome and Augustus at the Altar built just outside of 
Lugdunum.189 This altar is described by Strabo as bearing the names of the sixty tribes of Gaul as well as 
images of the tribes surrounding it.190 He also says that the altar was dedicated by all the Gauls in 
common which would fit with the representation they were given. The first sacerdos of the Altar was an 
Aeduan, fitting considering their longstanding relationship with the Romans.191 His name was C. Julius 
Vercondaridubnus, someone who had been rewarded with Roman citizenship by Julius Caesar or 
Augustus, a further sign of the Julii Gauls rising above the others and of the Gallo-Roman future of the 
provinces.192 In order to choose the new sacerdos, each year the tribes of Gaul sent representatives to 
Lugdunum to vote.193 These leading men became the Concilium Galliarum and gained an influence 
above and beyond that of simply choosing a new priest. With so many leading men gathered together, 
political matters would undoubtedly creep in as will be seen under later emperors.194 For now, though, 
the founding of the Altar and the formation of this council propelled Lugdunum to prominence above all 
other Gallic settlements and would make it the unofficial capital of the Three Gauls. As well, it seemed 
to have served the purpose for Drusus and Augustus, the Three Gauls were united in a way that not 
even Vercingetorix was able to do and the nature of the altar made it clear that these were Gallo-
Romans, not just Gauls living under the empire.195 Of course, this did not stop the old prejudices and a 
particularly egregious example can be found in the procurator, Licinus. 
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Licinus was originally a Gaul who was captured by Caesar and made a slave although he later 
freed him.196 Augustus, evidently trusting this man, made him procurator of Gaul where he caused a 
great deal of trouble. Licinus plundered the provinces to line his own pockets, purportedly going so far 
as to add months to the year in order to collect extra monthly tribute.197 Eventually the Gallo-Romans 
managed to get Augustus' attention on the matter, demanding that Licinus be punished for his crimes.198 
Astonishingly, he managed to avoid any penalty by bringing Augustus to his house and displaying the 
many items of silver, gold, and other precious materials that he had taken from the Gallo-Romans, 
saying that he did so to deny the natives the money they would need to revolt.199 According to Dio, this 
was enough to save Licinus from punishment.200 Notable here is that the Gallo-Romans appealed to the 
emperor rather than attacking Licinus or some other symbol of Roman authority. They were not 
resenting the taxes so much as the crooked tax collector, which is an important distinction. While Dio 
does not say that it was the Gallic Council which approached Augustus, it would make sense for that 
body to be involved, showing how quickly it was assuming wider responsibilities. It once again reinforces 
the loyalty of the Gallo-Romans at this juncture. This would prove especially important during the 
Germanic campaigns that followed as the Romans could not risk revolt at their rear when fighting such a 
dangerous enemy, one that would prove to be a match for the legions.  
At first, the war against the Germans went very well and soon Rome was bordering on the Elbe 
rather than the Rhine.201 There were severe supply issues, however, and areas that had been subdued in 
the summer tended to rebel in winter as soon as the legions withdrew to their camps.202 Tiberius and 
Drusus had made great strides in securing the region for Rome and it was beginning to look like Gaul 
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would not be a border province at all once the conquest was completed. Of course this was not to last 
and in 9 CE, P. Quinctilius Varus was ambushed in the Teutoburg forest and three legions were lost in 
Germany, forcing Rome to retreat to the Rhine.203 It is once again notable that the Gauls remained loyal 
following this disaster.204 Had they joined the Germans in attacking the Romans from the rear, the Rhine 
too may have fallen and it is impossible to say how far back the Romans would be pushed. Yet they 
remained steadfast, despite the depredations of Augustus' procurator (see above). The Gauls were by 
this point Gallo-Romans and not simply resigned to life under the Romans but embracing it otherwise 
they would have taken advantage of the opportunity provided. The new status quo would not become 
obvious for some time but this defeat would lead to the Three Gauls forever being a frontier region and 
tied closely to the army for both good and ill. Had Rome held onto the land between the Rhine and the 
Elbe it would be easy to envision the Three Gauls becoming another Spain, quiet and not needing a 
strong legionary presence. The continued presence of the legions and the constant threat of Germanic 
raids and invasions shaped Gallo-Romans politics until the end of the western empire. 205 
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When Tiberius came to power in 14 CE, he had enormous shoes to fill. Augustus had 
revolutionized Rome in nearly every way one could think of and Tiberius was hardly the most longed for 
heir. His ascension was greeted with little fanfare and his reluctant leadership soon grew tiresome for 
most of the empire. Roman Gaul had been transformed through Augustus' settlements but the Gauls 
were given little breathing room at the beginning of Tiberius' reign.  
Along both the Rhine and Danube fronts, the armies mutinied when they realised that 
retirement and better pay would not be forthcoming from the new emperor.206 Tiberius did not set out 
from Rome himself to deal with these mutinies but rather left them to Germanicus and Drusus on the 
Rhine and Danube fronts, respectively. Germanicus had control over both armies as the governor of 
Roman Gaul, where he was currently assessing the tribute.207 When news arrived of the mutiny, he 
rushed to the Lower Rhine legions, where the unrest was strongest. Among his numerous rhetorical 
arguments against their mutiny, he pointed out that all of Gaul remained loyal, which was indeed quite 
notable as the Gauls were only two generations removed from independence and were currently 
undergoing a census, usually a time of some trouble within a province.208 Yet even with the Upper Rhine 
armies in open mutiny, the Gauls remained steadfast, despite the opportunity the mutiny presented.209 
Germanicus discovered that the Lower Rhine legions had set the capital of the Ubii as a target for 
plunder and that the rest of the Gallic provinces were to follow shortly after.210 Aside from the utter 
disaster that turning upon the hard won allies, which the Gauls had become, would be, this would also 
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have left the Rhine wide open to Germanic invasion. Germanicus attempted to bring the renegade 
legions back into line but was forced to make large concessions to them.  
Even these concessions did not end the unrest and Germanicus decided to send his pregnant 
wife, Agrippina, and their infant son, Caligula, to the Treveri for protection.211 That he trusted the 
Treveran Gauls more than his own legions says much about both the level of unrest and the loyalty of 
the Gallic community; it is hard not to imagine the ransom available for the Treveri with the wife and 
children of the heir to the Roman empire in their grasp. Yet there was no indication that the Gauls were 
not trusted with them. This proved to be the key to restoring order to the legions. Their shame and 
jealousy of the Gauls, that the latter would be trusted over the emperor's legions with the safety of the 
imperial family, finally brought them back in line.212 This says a lot about the legionnaires' attitudes 
towards the Gauls: the latter were clearly looked down upon by the former and special favour could 
easily sow jealousy. Germanicus had finally quelled the uprising but he did not trust the loyalty of the 
legions enough to leave them be. Instead, he directed them where they could take out their aggression 
constructively: Germania.213 
The expedition launched by Germanicus, despite lacking any sort of official sanction or support 
from Tiberius, was a huge success. Gaul supplied vast levies to support the Germanic expeditions and 
with Gallic support added to the legions' strength, Germanicus was able to secure a wide swath of 
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territory on the eastern bank of the Rhine, inflict significant casualties on the Germans, and even 
recover two of the eagles lost by Varus. Even when there were setbacks, the successes thus far 
prompted Gaul, Spain, and Italy to compete in providing Germanicus with weapons, horses, or gold.214 
The German campaign was a spectacular achievement but not one that Tiberius could allow to continue. 
Even apart from the danger in allowing another member of the imperial house to upstage the prestige 
of the emperor, both in Italy and among the staunchest political allies of the Julio-Claudians, the Gauls, 
the expenses were beginning to wear on the provinces. Gaul was the chief supplier of the army and they 
were steadily being drained of their resources without much booty to show for it.215  
Tiberius therefore recalled Germanicus in 16 CE and awarded him a triumph before sending him 
out to the east, where he would die a short time later. The Rhine forces were withdrawn to the left bank 
of the river aside from one bridgehead opposite Moguntiacum. For the first time in decades, Gaul was 
free from both war with the Germans and the presence of imperial princes. While the princes 
showcased the importance of Gaul to the Julio-Claudians, their presence could only be a drain to 
resources and a distraction from domestic affairs. With the Pax Romana in place, the Gauls could begin 
to enjoy the fruits of Roman infrastructure and defence.216 At least, some of them were able to do so. 
As discussed before, there was a strong consolidation of land and power in the hands of a few 
leading aristocrats, most of whom had Roman citizenship and thus are known as the Julii Gauls.217 To 
this group, we are now able to add the negotiatores, the traders, and especially the nautae, the river 
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merchants, who amassed their fortunes from the trade within Gaul and especially with the army.218 
These men were often the clients of powerful Gallic nobles and thus made the latter even more wealthy 
through their cut of the trade.219 This wealth would only grow under the Julio-Claudians and would 
become a significant boon to aristocratic Gallo-Roman ambitions under future emperors.220 For many in 
the upper echelons, integration with the Roman empire had proven to be very profitable indeed. Not all 
the Gauls would benefit from this new arrangement, though, and the problems among the lower classes 
would cause even worse troubles for the Romans and Gallo-Roman relations. 
In the year 21 CE, the first significant Gallic rebellion since the conquest began, led by Julius 
Florus of the Treveri and Julius Sacrovir of the Aedui, both men who owed their Roman citizenship to the 
military services of their forebears and were continuing the family tradition by serving as auxiliary 
officers.221 Both their positions and tribes are worth noting as they were clearly from the aristocracy 
which had been granted citizenship by Augustus or Julius and were members of two of the richest tribes 
in Gaul, with the strongest ties to the Romans. The Aedui had produced the first priest of the imperial 
cult in Lugdunum and held the city of Augustodunum, a centre of Roman learning in Gaul, founded, as 
the name suggests, by Augustus himself.222 The Aedui had even been awarded the title of "Brother of 
the Roman People" since before the conquest, as mentioned above.223 Likewise, the Treveri had become 
integral to the Rhine frontier, supplying the legions with both auxiliary troops and supplies. As we saw, 
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Germanicus trusted them so much that he attempted to send them his pregnant wife and child for 
protection when the legions mutinied.  
News of Germanicus' death had made the Rhine legions restive, presenting the Gallic rebels 
with the best opportunity since the death of Augustus to make a break with the Roman empire.224 
Tacitus uses this war as another opportunity to point out the failings of Tiberius, blaming the extent of 
the rebellion on his indecisiveness. Yet the truth is different, even in Tacitus' own account. According to 
him, the rebellion began for economic reasons: continuous tribute, grinding rates of interest, and cruel 
and prideful governors.225 As noted, the recent Germanic expeditions had drained the resources of 
Roman Gaul; this would explain the complaints of tribute and debt.226 We are lacking in any details on 
the "cruel and prideful governors" but this charge may reflect the fact that Gaul had been without an 
imperial patron close at hand since Germanicus was recalled in 16 CE.227 With Tiberius all but 
abandoning Germania to the Germans, who were in no position to threaten the Romans across the 
Rhine at this point, Roman Gaul lost the importance it had held since the earliest days of Augustus' 
rule.228 The governors who took over may simply not have been as willing to indulge Gallic desires 
without a pressing need to supply a German offensive or prevent an uprising behind their lines. 
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According to Tacitus, this led to the seeds of rebellion being planted throughout Gaul, stirred up by 
speeches from Florus and Sacrovir.229  
The first outbreak started with the Andecavi and the Turoni but both were swiftly put down by 
the governor of Lugdunensis, Acilius Aviola.230 The Andecavi were easily quelled by the cohort stationed 
in Lugdunum but the latter required the aid of both legionnaires from lower Germany and Gallic 
auxiliaries, led in part by Sacrovir himself. According to Tacitus, the latter joined merely to screen their 
defection for the moment and unmask it at a more favourable time. Sacrovir even went into battle 
without a helmet, ostensibly to display his courage, but in reality so that he would not be targeted by 
the Turoni.  
Even though Tiberius was told of Sacrovir's possible involvement, he failed to act upon the 
information. Tacitus' charges seem problematic for a couple of reasons. First, the Gauls could hardly 
have asked for a better opportunity to destroy the legions in a piecemeal fashion. The legions had 
proven that they were more than a match for Gallic forces in an open battle but with surprise and 
treachery on their side, as well as the reduced number of legionnaires present, the odds would have 
been tilted in the other direction. Secondly, Tacitus writes that "Tiberius, consulted on the point, 
rejected the information, and fostered the war by his indecision." This fits Tacitus' bias against Tiberius 
quite well and whenever this happens, it is best to examine the historian's claims quite closely. It is more 
likely that Sacrovir was not yet fomenting rebellion but his later revolt cast his actions in this battle in a 
new light. Perhaps the testimony of the prisoners convinced Sacrovir after the fact of the need to throw 
off Roman dominance or the performance of the legions compared to the Gallic forces made him think it 
was possible. His connection with this part of the uprising is dubious at best and the same can be said 
for the next stage.  
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Julius Florus was the next to raise a rebellion among the Treveri but it did not begin very 
auspiciously.231 He attempted to bring an auxiliary of cavalry that was stationed near Trier over to his 
side but nearly all of them remained loyal to Rome. Instead, he managed to gather a number of 
dependents and debtors that were armed but hardly an army.232 These he marched into the Ardennes 
forest. His forces were trapped between legions from both the upper and lower Rhine and dispersed by 
Treveri loyal to Rome, led by Julius Indus, another Julii Gaul.233 Florus escaped but soon committed 
suicide when he realised the legions had cut off all avenues of escape. Once again the uprising was very 
local and unsuccessful. Also, Sacrovir was nowhere to be found. While the army that Florus had 
assembled was of little use in the open, they did not attempt to join up with Sacrovir in central Gaul, 
heading instead to the east. The reason for this was probably a lack of support from the Treveri. Florus 
had to retreat quickly before loyal Treveri attacked him, as they eventually did under the leadership of 
Julius Indus.  
There is another possibility, that the revolts were unrelated except in timing. There is no 
evidence linking the three separate uprisings, except Tacitus' account which lumps them together. There 
may have simply been a domino effect between them: as one group revolted, another was inspired to 
rise up as well. Finally, it is important to note that the rebellion was started by one Treveran and put 
down by another.234 As Tacitus states, Florus was unable to convince the auxiliaries to join him, meaning 
that the well off aristocratic youth had no desire to rebel; he was only able to gather lower class debtors 
who were of little use in a real fight. It is likely that Julius Indus and his men represented the opinions of 
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the majority of the tribe, those who were benefitting from Roman rule and had no desire to break way 
at this time.  
Finally, we turn once again to Sacrovir, who by now was leading his own uprising.235 Sacrovir, at 
least, met with some success, unlike his compatriot. He had the advantage of the greater wealth of his 
tribe and the relative remoteness of the legions. Aeduan territory was in central Gaul which had few 
legionnaires, unlike the Treveri who were close neighbours of the lower Rhine legions. Sacrovir seized 
the city of Augustodunum.236 By taking control of this city he would have a ready supply of either willing 
young nobles to join his army or else hostages to ensure that the other Gallic tribes would not stand 
against him since many great Gallic families had sons receiving an education in the city.237 He managed 
to gather forty thousand followers, one fifth armed like legionnaires, the rest with hunting weapons. 
Additionally, he freed a number of gladiatorial slaves who fought in heavy iron armour and were nearly 
impervious to harm. To these a steady stream of supporters arrived from the surrounding territory. 
While no other tribes officially joined Sacrovir, private individuals did make their way to him, no doubt 
buoyed by the lack of response from the Roman legions. The upper and lower Rhine commanders 
disputed who should have command and thus neither made a move to stop the rebellion at first. By the 
time the lower commander, Varro, withdrew in favour of the upper, Silius, word of the rebellion had 
spread to Rome.238 
According to Tacitus, the eternal city was thrown into a panic far exceeding the actual scope of 
the rebellion.239 Rumors swirled that not only the Aedui and the Treveri were rebelling but all the tribes 
                                                          
235
 Tac. Ann. 3.44-46. 
236
 Tac. Ann. 3.43. Jullian (1913) vol iv 158, follows Tacitus, that the city of students from many great Gallic families 
provided Sacrovir with many hostages.  
237
 Tac. Ann. 3.43. 
238
 Tac. Ann. 3.43. 
239
 Tac. Ann. 3.44. Urban (1999) 43, notes that this reaction was highly overblown compared to the extent of the 
rebellion. It was simply used a political tool to attack Tiberius in his view. This would again fit Tacitus' view of 
46 
 
of Gaul and that they were joined by the Germans across the Rhine and even that the Spanish were 
considering throwing in with the rebels. Tiberius' inaction in the face of these rumors was viewed 
harshly even though it would soon be clear that the situation did not require his direct involvement. 
Taking Tacitus at face value, the sheer panic shows just how close to the surface the terror Gallicus was 
for the Roman people.240 As soon as they received word of a rebellion, it was blown way out of 
proportion, with fears of another Gallic sack of Rome looming large in the minds of the populace. It is 
unfortunately unclear who in the city was making these accusations. Tacitus mentions only the best 
people worrying about the state while those who wanted change in leadership used the rumours as an 
excuse to attack Tiberius, who was acting very unconcerned.241 There is no clear indication what groups 
of people are being referred to here. The best people may be a reference to the nobility but that may be 
stretching Tacitus' words more than necessary, he could very well just be referring to those who cared 
most about the safety of the state as the best men. It later becomes clear why such rumours were 
swirling, however, as it is not until the revolt ends that Tiberius informed the senate.242 If the senators 
were only receiving official word after the fact, then the common people would have been even less 
well informed and every snippet of information from those travelling abroad would be passed on and 
exaggerated in a large scale version of a game of telephone. Clearly the Roman people did not yet trust 
the loyalty of the Gauls, despite over half a century of Gallic aid against the Germans. Of course, it would 
soon be clear that the Romans had nothing to fear from this revolt, regardless of their prejudices.  
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When Silius finally set out against Sacrovir, he first devastated the villages of the Sequani, who 
were situated between their two forces.243 It is worth noting that Tacitus makes no mention of Sequani 
disloyalty up to this point so Silius may have been attacking Gauls for the sake of attacking Gauls.244 
Sacrovir set out to meet him and awaited the inevitable Roman attack. He attempted to rouse his men 
by reminding them of ancient Gallic victories and reverses they had inflicted on the Romans while also 
scaring them with the threat of what would happen if they lost. Sacrovir's words had little effect, the 
untrained men he had assembled began to lose their nerve when confronted by Silius' legions.245 Silius, 
on the other hand, managed to induce a great shout from his men by pointing out how pitiful the Gauls 
were. They had defeated the Germans after all, what fear did they have of the Gauls? The Turoni were 
driven off by a single cohort, the Treveri by a single cavalry division, and his own army had put down the 
Sequani.246 The legions made short work of the Gallic forces, with only the armoured gladiators being 
able to stand up to the Roman legions, and Sacrovir fled, only to commit suicide when he realised 
capture was imminent, just like Florus.247 The weakness of his forces in battle shows how few of the 
auxiliaries joined his revolt. Had they done so, they could have stiffened the resistance and if not win, 
then at least make a better fight of it.248 While the Aeduan position had helped Sacrovir build up his 
rebellion in relative safety, it also left him apart from any auxiliary forces that he could convince to join 
him. Tacitus' description of the army as undrilled townsmen makes it clear that Sacrovir's forces were 
                                                          
243
 Tac. Ann. 3.45. Seager (2005) 142 claims that the Sequani joined in the rebellion but the only evidence is the 
attack itself.  
244
 This may reflect his later indictment for extortions in Gaul. See below.  
245
 Ta. Ann. 3.46. 
246
 The condescension is palpable in Tacitus' text. This reflects the attitude the legions held towards the Gauls. 
Rather than seeing them as allies against the Germans and fellow members of the Roman empire, they were a 
pathetic people who could not be trusted. Cf. Tac. Ann. 4.5., the legions were along the Rhine to quell the Gauls as 
much as defend from the Germans.  
247
 Aside from the lack of training, a paucity of real weapons would have made defeat likely for the rebels, see 
Brunt (1975) 265. 
248
 Urban (1999) 44. 
48 
 
little better than Florus', except in sheer numbers. Clearly the mass uprising of all the Gallic tribes that 
he had hoped for and the Romans had feared, failed to materialize.249 
The inconsequentiality of the revolt is best expressed by Tiberius' letter to the senate. He 
announced both the outbreak and completion of the "war" in this single missive.250 While criticisms may 
have been laid at his feet for his lack of action when the rebellion broke out, Tiberius was vindicated by 
the swiftness of the victory. He said that his presence during the revolt would send the wrong message 
but now that it was over, he would go himself and settle matters. Unfortunately, we do not know what 
settlements were made in the wake of the rebellion, although we do know that Tiberius never actually 
journeyed to Gaul himself to make them.251 Neither Tacitus nor any other source mentions what they 
were. We do know that immediately following the fighting, Silius extorted money from the Gauls but the 
wealth they would display later under Caligula and Claudius meant that however bad the depredations 
were, they were not crippling.252 The Treveri were unlikely to have suffered for their part in the rebellion 
as it was largely put down by Treveri auxiliaries commanded by their own Julius Indus.253 Most of the 
tribes, in fact, had remained loyal (sixty out of sixty-four) and even among the tribes who did participate, 
revolutionary feelings were clearly not universal.254  
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Life in the Three Gauls, it would seem, continued on as before. The real change was in Roman 
attitudes. As mentioned above, this revolt seems to have revived the terror Gallicus, which had lain 
dormant for some years. Germany had held the popular attention, especially after the defeat of Varus. 
The Gauls were allies at best, weakened subjects at worst. Now the populace recalled the panic of a 





 Out of all the Julio-Claudian emperors, one would not expect Caligula to have had that much of 
an influence on Roman Gaul. After all, he was in office for only four short years and had to fight the 
senate for most of that time, a situation that limited his impact on the empire in general, let alone a 
specific region. Yet he spent more time in Gaul as emperor than any other member of his dynasty except 
Augustus himself, a historical fact that is often lost in the morass of attempted coups and honours for 
horses. It was because of one of these assassination attempts that Caligula travelled to Gaul in the first 
place in 39 CE, roughly two years into his reign.  
 Caligula had already survived an attempted assassination by a group of senators not long before 
but the next attempt hit far closer to home. Two of Caligula's sisters, Livia and Agrippina, were involved 
in the plot, as were their husbands. Their involvement alone was dangerous enough but the real threat 
came from the commander of the Upper Rhine legions, Gaetulicus.255 He had held this position for two 
decades and thus had a firm grip on his troops who were the closest military forces to Rome itself. When 
Caligula learned of the plot, he quickly had the conspirators he knew of in Rome arrested and then 
rushed into Gaul with a hastily assembled army. This bold move managed to catch Gaetulicus 
completely off guard and he was unable to organize any sort of resistance. Caligula had him arrested 
and executed, replacing him with Galba, who would also play an important role in Gaul in the future.256 
This march into Gaul would be notable but largely superfluous to any understanding of Gallic attitudes 
had Caligula not remained there for some time. Instead of returning to Rome, Caligula took an interest 
in the military affairs of the region.  
 The exact chain of events after Caligula stopped the conspiracy is difficult to piece together from 
the sources, as those writing about Caligula spent a great deal of time trying to make him seem insane 
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even when he was acting rationally.257 For example, Caligula's march to Germania was said by Suetonius 
to have been a means of recruiting more men for his Germanic bodyguard; but Suetonius also claims 
that the emperor assembled an army from across the empire to do so.258 Clearly Caligula needed these 
troops for something else, as a force of this size to hire guards makes no sense. Dio makes a similarly 
odd claim that Germania was only a pretext and that Caligula's true goal was to plunder wealthy Gaul. 
This seems plausible enough at face value but Dio also writes that the army gathered to do this 
numbered 200,000 to 250,000.259 Not only would this have been extreme overkill but the expense of 
such an army would drain more than it could loot.  
So what was really happening in Gaul at this time? Ironically enough, Suetonius gives us the 
clues. In his biography of Galba, he mentions that in the fall of the year when he became governor, he 
repelled barbarians who had advanced into Gaul on raids.260 As well, his Life of Vespasian mentions that 
the future emperor proposed in the senate special games to be held to mark Caligula's victory over the 
tribes of Germania.261 Even Suetonius' attempts to mock Caligula points to military activity, as when he 
claims that Caligula performed a cavalry raid on some of his own German bodygaurds, returning to camp 
with branches cut from trees on the far bank of the Rhine.262 It is another event that is easy to dismiss as 
farce, but it was likely to have been a training exercise, practicing fording the river or even cutting back 
the trees on the far side to prevent ambushes.263 Dio also gives a hint as he claims that the emperor had 
himself acclaimed imperator several times.264 Clearly there was trouble along the Rhine with the 
Germanic tribes and they were deemed serious enough to warrant the gathering of a large army to deal 
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with them.265 Caligula deemed the situation so important that rather than return to Rome for the winter 
when the campaigning season was over, he only withdrew from the front and set himself up in 
Lugdunum.266  
 While he was there he began raising funds to pay for his army. Here we can at last get a voice 
from the Gallo-Romans as they were the ones who financed the troops. Dio claims that this was done in 
part by Caligula going over the tax rolls and giving instructions to execute the richest inhabitants.267 
There is no indication that this was carried out, even in the rest of Dio's account but the emperor found 
another way to raise funds that was even more effective. As part of the punishment for their 
involvement in the conspiracy against him, Caligula auctioned off all the household effects of his sisters, 
including slaves and even freedmen, presenting them to the wealthy men of Roman Gaul.268 This proved 
to be so successful that Caligula gave the order for other valuable imperial items that had accrued under 
the previous two emperors to be packed up and shipped to Gaul so that they too could be auctioned 
off.269 The sheer size of the shipments was such that private vehicles had to be seized to transport them 
all. So many were taken for these shipments that the grain supply was affected and Rome experienced a 
shortage.270 Dio claims that those who attended these auctions (apparently led by Caligula himself) were 
compelled to buy items but this again seems unlikely. If that had been the case it would have been easy 
enough to simply not to attend, especially since the leading men of Roman Gaul did not normally live in 
Lugdunum but rather amongst their own tribes.  
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Instead, the wealthy Gallo-Romans likely leapt at the chance to own actual pieces of the 
imperial court as status symbols of both their wealth and prestige. They were quickly moving towards 
their request for admittance to the senate and this proved they had both the money and political clout 
to do so. Suetonius provides an anecdote that illustrates this quite well.271 One wealthy Gallo-Roman 
wished to attend one of the many feasts held by Caligula in Lugdunum so he bribed a servant to smuggle 
him in. This, of course, would not have been all that noteworthy except that the man offered 200,000 
sesterces to the servant for this privilege. When Caligula learned of this he had the man buy some small 
item at the next day's auction and said he could attend the banquet at his personal invitation. This 
anecdote could explain Dio's story about the Gauls being forced to buy items at the auction. He may 
have simply extended it from one individual to their entirety. The upper classes were clearly doing quite 
well under Roman rule and wanted to get closer to the centre of power. The emperor did, in fact show 
them some favour as in addition to the festivities, including oration competitions in both Latin and 
Greek, and auctions, Caligula also granted the citizens of Vienna Roman citizenship.272 
 Yet all this accumulated wealth seems to have come to naught. Rather than continue the attacks 
on Germania, which the Gallo-Romans would have no doubt appreciated as it protected their territory 
from raids, the emperor turned his attention to Britain instead.273 Once again, the sources are little help 
in determining why this shift took place, only that it did. This new direction may have been spurred by 
the dispute over the succession of the British king Cynobellinus, just the kind of internal dispute that 
Romans were so adept at exploiting.274 The circumstances could have lead to a quick victory and a highly 
prestigious one as Julius Caesar had shown (or at least attempted) before and Claudius would 
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demonstrate just three years later.275 Britain probably looked like a far better option than Germania 
which had been mismanaged ever since Varro's disaster in 9 CE.276 Furthermore, the situation in Rome 
was becoming more tense and Caligula felt the need to return there soon and with victory behind him. 
He lacked the military experience that Augustus, Tiberius, and his own father had been able to boast of; 
an easy victory in Britain could give him all the prestige he needed. Unfortunately for the emperor, this 
too was denied to him. The invasion never took place277 and Caligula was forced to give away much of 
the wealth he had accumulated from the auctions to the soldiers.278 He returned to Rome and was soon 
after assassinated.  
 This episode in Gallic history shows just how successful the leading Gallo-Romans were at the 
time. Almost unheard of wealth was in the hands of the prominent men, allowing them essentially to 
finance an entire army for Caligula while accruing tokens of legitimacy from him. The value of these 
imperial items cannot be overstated, they showed the Roman world that the Gallo-Romans were willing 
and able to play on the imperial scale. Caligula's successor would not forget the value of Gallo-Roman 
support and would use it to succeed where Caligula had failed and pull the Gauls all the way to the 
senate.  
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 The emperor Claudius found himself in a rather precarious position at the beginning of his reign. 
Relying on Praetorian support, he had no personal accomplishments to shore up his power base, with 
the senate and the common people of Rome both regarding him as little more than a joke. Fortunately 
for him, Caligula had left him a campaign that was ripe for the taking, with many of the preparations 
already completed. Claudius would conquer Britain and thus legitimize his rule in the eyes of the 
Romans and the provincials.  
 Unlike Caligula, who prepared and campaigned with his forces the entire time, Claudius would 
remain in Rome during both the preliminary build-up and even the initial landing on the island. This 
decision was not without merit since Caligula had chastened the Germans for their raids just a few years 
before and they were showing no signs of causing trouble again just yet.279 Likewise, the Gallo-Romans 
seemed not just complacent in their new role as provincials but their exuberance for the imperial goods 
auctioned off showed a willingness and desire to become even more Roman, at least among the elites. 
Additionally, Caligula had already raised new legions which could be left along the relatively quiet Rhine 
frontier while Claudius pulled veteran troops from the Rhine and Spain for the British expedition.280 
Thus, Claudius could be confident that the expedition would be well staffed and would not have to 
worry about enemies at their rear. Once the initial landings had taken place and a foothold was well 
secured along the Thames, Claudius set out from Rome with a substantial entourage accompanying 
him.281 This group included Praetorian guards, Senators and their own entourages, members of the 
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imperial staff, and his promising young son-in-law. To these were joined other army contingents as 
Claudius passed through Gaul, including elephants.282 Such a spectacle could only have impressed the 
Gallo-Romans and was likely made all the more spectacular when Claudius returned through Gaul little 
more than a fortnight later having won a major victory and leaving little more than mopping up 
operations for his commanders.283 The expedition must have impressed the Gallo-Romans a good deal 
for when Claudius celebrated a triumph for his victory in Britain, the silver crown sent from Gallia 
Comata weighed an astounding nine thousand pounds.284 Clearly Claudius was right not to worry about 
the Gauls rebelling while Britain was being subdued as they showed pride in the empire's 
accomplishment as if they were true Romans. Soon, in fact, they would make a request that would put 
them further along that path.  
 As we have seen, citizenship was flourishing among the Gallo-Romans.285 Some families could 
trace their line back for several generations of Gauls who had Roman citizenship and these men were 
usually immensely rich landholders.286 There was a second group of wealthy Gallo-Romans, however, 
merchants who had benefitted greatly from the Pax Romana in Gaul and the increasingly well-
developed infrastructure. The road network that had been initially constructed by Agrippa was 
essentially finished by Claudius, helping internal trade even more.287 It is likely that the new Claudii 
Gauls, having obtained their citizenship through Claudius, emerged from the merchant classes so that 
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their wealth could better be exploited by the emperor.288 The chief towns of the Treveri and the Ubii 
were both given full colonial status, a great benefit to these communities with close ties to the 
legions.289 Claudius clearly never forgot the territory he was born in and Lugdunum, his birth city, was 
granted the title of Claudia, while Agrippina's birthplace of Cologne became Colonia Claudia Ara 
Agrippinensium.290 Claudius was proving to be the best patron yet for the Gallo-Romans with the 
honours he was giving to them.291 Yet the largest increase in the fortunes of the Gallo-Romans was yet 
to come: Claudius brought them into the Senate.  
 In the year 48 CE, while Claudius was censor, he was petitioned by the Gallo-Romans of Gallia 
Comata for the privilege to join the senate.292 There were, understandably, some objections raised 
regarding this idea but it seems that Claudius was willing to argue in favour of the Gauls. We have two 
accounts of this speech, one by Tacitus and, remarkably, one apparently recording a significant part of 
Claudius' actual words.293 The latter was found inscribed on a bronze plate in the city of Lyon, or 
Lugdunum as it would have been when the inscription was recorded. It would be best to look at 
Claudius' recorded words first, which may reflect his genuine arguments more than Tacitus' invented 
speech. Claudius begins with a collection of examples from Roman history showing that innovative 
proposals such as his are not to be feared, from the time of Romulus right up to Augustus and Tiberius. 
Next, he discusses the Gallic elite that were already part of the Roman magistracies, largely from Gallia 
Narbonensis. His final argument rests on the loyalty of the Gauls since the conquest by Julius Caesar. For 
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many scholars, the speech is filled with problems.294 Even though we only have two short sections, it 
manages to ramble and depart onto pointless tangents regarding Etruscan history that do not back up 
his argument. His examples of leading men from Gallia Narbonensis include an equestrian (hardly the 
most relevant) and two disgraced senators. His speech is even interrupted by outbursts from senators 
which betray the prejudice they held against non-Italian senators, let alone those from Gallia Comata. 
His concluding remarks, at least, seem more sound. He points out the loyalty of the Gauls, as they did 
not turn on his father, Drusus, when he was called away to war in Germania even though they were 
undergoing a census at the time, something the Gauls would be unused to. This is indeed a fair point but 
it neglects to mention the rebellion that had taken place in 21 CE by Florus and Sacrovir, something the 
senators are unlikely to have forgotten.295 Of course, there are other views which defend Claudius from 
accusations of being an incompetent speaker. His foray into Etruscan history reflects the innovation 
inherent to the Roman system, appropriate, perhaps since his own position as emperor was still quite 
novel. By discussing Priscus, who was barred from office in Tarquinii because he was the child of a 
Corinthian immigrant and an impoverished Tuscan noblewoman, Claudius is making arguments against 
objections based on birth, nationality, wealth, and previous office, all of which were highly relevant.296 
Even those sections which some have taken to be interruptions from Senators could simply be rhetorical 
flourishes on Claudius' part.297 
Tacitus attempted to shore up the emperor's arguments a good deal in his account.298 He begins 
by putting easily countered arguments in the mouths of nameless advisors of Claudius. His advisors 
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make it clear that they would prefer Italian senators at least and even these they grant only grudgingly 
to the non-Latins.299 They will not stand for the grandsons and great-grandsons of the men who had 
besieged Julius Caesar at Alesia becoming senators, saying it would vulgarize the positions and honours. 
They even raise the spectre of the sack of Rome in 390 BCE, showing that event was always in the back 
of the Roman mind when dealing with Gauls and that the terror Gallicus was always looming behind any 
Gallo-Romans relations, whether as a true fear or a rhetorical tool against the Gallo-Romans.300 The 
advisors also contrast the "poor" senators from Latium to the opulent Gallo-Romans who were asking 
for admittance.301 Tacitus' Claudius manages neatly to counter these arguments by drawing upon 
Roman history much like Claudius' speech found on the tablet, although the examples used are 
different.302 He points out that many leading patrician families had their origins in other cities, including 
the Julii from Alba and his own Claudii from the Sabines.303 Others, he states, have come to Rome from 
Spain or Gallia Narbonensis and yet they have not betrayed Rome to their homelands.304 He also 
dismisses the arguments from past battles with the Gauls since the Romans had given hostages to the 
Tuscans, passed under the yoke of the Samnites, and fought against other Italians who now enjoyed 
senatorial ranks.305 Finally, their wealth should not be considered a detriment but a bonus; by making 
the Gallo-Romans senators, they will spend their money in Rome and for the empire rather than 
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hoarding it in Gaul.306 Claudius' speech is followed by a resolution of the senators and the Gallo-Romans 
were granted senatorial rights in the capital.307 
The Aedui were the first granted the right to become Roman senators, a privilege that reflected 
their close relationship with the Romans since before the conquest.308 In granting this privilege, the 
senate was ignoring the fact that the Aedui were heavily involved in Sacrovir's revolt, though not 
officially.309 Evidently this fact was either easily forgotten or easily overlooked. It was not long, however, 
before other Gallic communities could boast their own senatorial families.310 This led to the Gallo-
Romans commemorating the passage of this resolution by inscribing the bronze tablets found in 
Lugdunum. The fact that the tablets were found here, rather than the chief city of the Aedui, 
Augustodunum, implies that it was a Gallic Council, during one of their annual meetings in the city, 
which made this request to the emperor, perhaps going through the well connected families of the 
Aedui to do so.311 The fact that the Gauls themselves made this request shows just how Romanized the 
upper echelons of their society had become. Far from waiting and watching for the ideal time to make a 
break with the empire, they instead wished to strengthen their ties even more. This a mere generation 
after Florus and Sacrovir's revolt and, as Tacitus points out, only a few more from the Gauls being 
independent peoples desperately attempting to hold on to their freedom against the conquest of Julius 
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Caesar.312 This remarkable shift in such a short period of time highlights the adaptability of the Gallo-
Romans. 
One other interesting aspect is the senatorial vote on this resolution. As censor and emperor, 
Claudius had the power simply to grant the request himself but he chose to make the symbolic gesture 
of having the senate vote on the matter.313 This was perhaps a bit risky as Claudius was never on the 
best terms with a senate that looked down on him and the interruptions in the recorded speech indicate 
quite clearly that not everyone was on board with the idea. Tacitus' account makes this all the more 
clear, with the prejudices and outright expressions of terror Gallicus being rallied against the idea of 
Gauls being allowed into the senate. Yet the measure was passed, despite the poor rhetorical skills of 
Claudius. The importance of wealth may have tipped the balance as it factored into both the arguments 
for and against. A treasury which had been drained by Caligula's excesses may have held more 
importance than the dignity of the senatorial seats.314 
Claudius' influence was still felt in Roman Gaul after the adlection of the Gallic senators. More 
Claudii Gauls joined the ranks of citizens, the roads were improved, and the border with Germania well 
looked after. When the emperor was assassinated in 54 CE, the Gallo-Romans lost their greatest 
advocate. Under Augustus and Tiberius, the Gallo-Romans demonstrated their military abilities and 
willingness to support Rome; under Caligula they had shown their wealth and ability to bankroll the 
empire; now under Claudius they achieved the ability to prove their magisterial capabilities to the still 
biased Roman world. This was the height of Gallo-Roman power and wealth and one could scarcely 
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believe that they would fall so far a mere fifteen years from then. Nero, unfortunately for them, was a 





 The evidence for the emperorship of Nero is challenging. The ancient sources all contain a 
strong bias against Nero and the stories of his reign are sometimes too fanciful to believe. We are not 
really concerned with the tales of Nero's debauchery or his involvement in sports, theatre, and music; 
and unlike previous Julio-Claudians, who had strong connections with Gaul and the west in general, 
Nero would focus his attention on Greece and the east. Yet his rule still had profound repercussions for 
Roman Gaul and would help spark the biggest shift in Gallo-Roman relations for centuries to come. The 
catalyst for these changes began far from Gaul, in the city of Rome itself, and outside anyone's control: 
the Great Fire of Rome.  
 In July of 64 CE the Great Fire of Rome began and continued to burn unabated for nine days.315 
The damage was unprecedented and required massive rebuilding efforts to restore the city. To Nero's 
credit, he put in a great deal of effort to aid those who had been made homeless by the fire. Temporary 
dwellings were built and the Campus Martius, Agrippa's buildings, and even his own gardens were 
opened for those seeking shelter. Additionally, Nero lowered the price of grain and brought in other 
necessary goods from Ostia to make sure everyone was provided for.316 Then he began to build. Nero's 
rebuilding of Rome drastically reshaped the city, with wider avenues and colonnades in front of private 
dwellings that were designed to lessen the risks of future fires and were paid for by public funds. Cash 
incentives were granted to private builders to finish their work quickly and up to the set standards. The 
temples which were damaged or destroyed received major refitting and/or rebuilding.317 All of this gives 
Nero the appearance of a benevolent and intelligent leader who saw to the immediate needs of his 
capital after the worst crisis it had faced in centuries.  
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Of course there was also his grandiose palace built in a space cleared by the fire and so 
expensive that it managed to "fritter away the resources of a Caesar".318 As for the rest of his building 
projects, while they were very beneficial to the city and provided for the displaced poor (aside from the 
palace), they were very expensive. Here we find the first link to Gaul, as Nero squeezed the provinces 
(along with the temples and the rich) for all the money he needed. Suetonius claims that "from the 
contributions which he not only received, but even demanded, he nearly bankrupted the provinces and 
exhausted the resources of individuals," which, naturally, included the famously wealthy Gauls, whom 
Caligula had used to finance his failed British expedition and who had the money and clout needed to 
lobby for inclusion in the Senate under Claudius.319 Tacitus goes so far as to claim that the provinces 
were ruined by the heavy burden placed on them due to the rebuilding costs. Roman Gaul was feeling 
the squeeze alongside the other provinces. There is also an inscription which may be of note regarding 
the rebuilding, which was recorded in Gaius' Institutes.320 It records an offer extended to Latini citizens 
giving them the right to build within the city of Rome. While it cannot be dated aside from the reign of 
Nero, it would make a great deal of sense for this to have followed the fire as it follows with the other 
incentives Nero offered. Also of note is the fact that a great many of these colonies would have been 
situated in Roman Gaul (Lugdunum, etc.) and that many native Gauls who had obtained Roman 
citizenship, could have been residing within one of them. Thus there may have been an influx of Gallo-
Romans after the fire, buying up plots of land that used to belong to native Romans, although this is 
supposition based upon the inscription which does not single out any region in particular, only colonies. 
This could only have strained tensions between the two groups more.  
                                                          
318
 Tac. Ann. 15.42. 
319
 Suet. Nero 38.3. Dio 62.18.5 echoes this same method of acquisition. See above for the wealth of the Gauls 
under previous emperors. It is probable that Suetonius is being hyperbolic about the burden placed on the 
provinces in order to paint Nero in a worse light. That said the expense of the rebuilding would have been large 
and is mentioned in other sources as well. 
320
 Gai. Inst. 1.33. Coskun (2009) 59-60 interprets the Latini as Latini coloniarii. 
65 
 
 As discussed earlier, the Roman perspective on the Gauls was often negatively coloured by the 
sack of Rome in 390 BCE.321 The disaster of the fire echoed the destruction of the sack and references to 
it, both implicit and explicit, are rife throughout the ancient accounts. Tacitus tells us that when the 
Sibylline books were consulted after the fire, sacrifices and rites were to be offered to four gods to 
appease them and ask them to spare the city: Vulcan, Ceres, Prosperpina, and Juno. For three of these 
gods the significance is quite clear as Vulcan is the god of fire, and Ceres and Prosperpina both had 
temples near the origin of the fire. Juno's importance is harder to determine, especially since the 
Capitoline had escaped the fire, unless one views the fire through the lens of the sack of 390 BCE. Juno 
Moneta is the incarnation that was being beseeched, the same Juno whose geese had warned 
Capitolinus of the Gauls' sneak attack and was strongly tied to the sack and reconstruction of Rome after 
the Gauls were defeated.322 Tacitus writes that some found significance in the date of the fire since July 
19 was not only the day the fire started but also the traditional date for the sack and that an equal 
number of days, months, and years had passed between the sack and the fire.323 Tacitus makes another 
deliberate reference to the sack when he talks of the rebuilding efforts, contrasting the supposed 
indiscriminate and piecemeal work done after the sack to the deliberate and well planned streets after 
the fire.324  
There are also more oblique references such as Tacitus' echoes of Livy's account of the sack 
when Tacitus describes the clades, disaster, of the fire and the rebuilding as a nova urbs, a new city.325 
Tacitus is not alone in making this connection as Cassius Dio claims that the people mourned their 
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shared tragedy by recalling that once before most of the city had been laid waste by the Gauls.326 He 
also wrote that the disaster was unparalleled either before or since except for the Gallic invasion.327 
Even Suetonius, who blames the fire entirely on Nero, makes reference to the spoils of the Gallic wars 
being lost in the fire.328 Clearly for the ancient authors these two events were connected and it was 
impossible to think of one without recalling the other. While the Christians bore most of the 
contemporary blame for the fire and Nero took on most of it after his death, the recollection and 
newfound prominence of the sack of Rome could not have helped Gallo-Roman relations. Italy, if not 
necessarily Rome itself, was still the largest recruitment area for legionnaires who served along the 
Rhine.329 Even if they were not present for the fire and the rhetoric that followed, they surely would 
have heard the news and quite probably, the conflation with the Gallic sack. These men would soon 
prove that they were ready to turn on the Gallo-Romans if given the chance and such a stark reminder 
could only exacerbate their prejudices. As well, since Claudius' reign, there were Gauls serving in the 
Senate, so they would have had firsthand exposure to the correlation of their people and destruction at 
Rome. While we cannot know the mood of Roman Gaul at the time, in a few short years it would 
become clear just how far they felt themselves pushed by the repercussions of the fire.  
Gallo-Roman tensions seem to have finally come to a head when Gaius Julius Vindex began a 
rebellion in March 68 CE. He was said to be a descendent of Aquitanian kings. His father had been a 
senator, probably brought into the senate by the emperor Claudius in 48 CE. He followed in his father's 
footsteps and was not only a senator but also the governor of Gallia Lugdunensis in 68 CE.330 
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Interestingly, it was in this capacity, that of a Roman senator and governor rather than a Gallic 
aristocrat, that Vindex's rebellion started.331 Vindex began by sending out letters to other governors, 
asking them to join him in overthrowing Nero.332 Nearly all of those he sent such a letter to forwarded 
them to Nero, tipping off the emperor that trouble was brewing in Gaul. Only Servius Sulpicius Galba, 
the governor of Hispania Tarraconensis, refrained from turning over his letter. Despite this lackluster 
show of support from his fellow governors, Vindex went ahead with the revolt, perhaps judging that 
others would join him once the rebellion was underway since Nero was so unpopular. This turned out to 
be at least partially true as when Vindex sent another letter to Galba inviting him to become the new 
emperor, Galba accepted.333 Despite this alliance, however, Galba was not quick to move outside his 
own province and thus was not able to help Vindex when the latter ran into opposition.  
 Vindex's problems began almost immediately. It became clear that he did not have widespread 
support and, more importantly, lacked military backing. Lugdunensis had no strong legionary presence 
and the forces on the Rhine did not support the revolt. Instead, he was able to garner some local 
support from the tribes of southern Gaul, the Aedui of Lugdunensis, the Arverni of Aquitania, the 
Sequani of Belgica, and the city of Vienna in Narbonensis.334 While this gave the revolt a pan-Gallic 
appearance, in reality most of the tribes remained indifferent to Vindex's call to "succour [themselves], 
and succour the Romans."335 Even the urban cohort stationed in Lugdunum, the most important 
settlement in Lugdunensis and arguably of all Gaul, refused to join in Vindex's revolt and shut him and 
his supporters out of the city. Even more significantly, the soldiers along the Rhine remained aloof, 
neither declaring for Vindex and Galba nor making any move to stop them, at least at first.  
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This changed, however, when Vindex made his biggest mistake: raising a militia force of local 
Gauls. He called upon those tribes who had pledged their support to furnish him with troops. It is an 
open question whether Vindex believed he was acting as a Gallic warlord, summoning troops through 
his ties to the Gallic aristocracy, or as a Roman magistrate, calling upon the local militia in a time of 
crisis. It seems likely that Vindex was of the latter opinion, based upon his actions thus far during the 
rebellion. After all, he had expressed no desire to split Gaul from the empire but rather to restore 
dignity to the emperorship.336 At no point did Vindex indicate he wanted to be emperor himself or even 
to restore the republic. Instead it seems that his only goal was to install a better princeps than Nero. This 
also precludes any desire on his part for a 'free Gaul', separate from the Roman empire and at no point 
did he express any interest in breaking away.337  
Despite this, Vindex's raising of what were likely thousands338 of Gallic troops did not sit well 
with the legions of the Upper German military zone. They, at least, seemed to view Vindex as little more 
than a Gallic warlord, despite his high station within the Roman bureaucracy and his expressions of 
loyalty to the state if not to Nero himself. Later events would show that these men had no loyalty to 
Nero339 and thus would have had every reason to side with Vindex, especially now that Galba had 
joined, giving the whole affair a sense of legitimacy. I believe there was one factor which drove them 
and their commander, Lucius Verginius Rufus340, to make war upon Vindex; the terror Gallicus, the fear 
of the Gauls which had been a defining feature of Gallo-Roman relations since the sack of Rome by 
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Brennus.341 The legions who every day faced down Germans from across the Rhine could not 
countenance a Gallic uprising at their backs and that is exactly how they viewed Vindex's rebellion as 
would soon be made clear. 
 Only a few short weeks after Vindex's original uprising, the two forces met at Vesontio, modern-
day Besançon, which had closed its gates on Rufus.342 The latter's legions besieged the city and Vindex 
marched to relieve it. However, there were several exchanged messages and meetings between Vindex 
and Rufus as the former drew closer to the city.343 The fact that these negotiations were taking place 
implies that Rufus at least did not view Vindex as merely a Gallic rebel. It is likely that Vindex had been in 
contact with Rufus before the rebellion in the same fashion that he had been with the other governors, 
so Rufus would have had a good idea of his intentions. Exactly what sort of accord they were coming to 
is impossible to know, although one source even states that Rufus had made a pact to join Vindex's 
rebellion.344 Whatever agreement the two men came to, the Roman legions cut short any accord 
between them.345 When Vindex's troops approached Vesontio, the Roman forces attacked on their own 
initiative (αὐτοκέλευστοι) and began a battle which the Gallic forces had no hope of winning.346 
According to Plutarch, some 20,000 of Vindex's men perished, no doubt an inflated number but it does 
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suggest a large loss of life. Vindex took his own life when he saw the disaster that had befallen his men 
and the rebellion in Gaul came to an inglorious end.  
This is a clear case of the Romans falling prey to the terror Gallicus.347 Rufus had already worked 
out some sort of arrangement with Vindex, there was no reason for his troops to attack.348 All the 
sources make it clear that Rufus had no say in the matter, though, and thus it was the fear of these 
Gallic rebels which must have seized the legions. It could not have been for riches, Vindex would not 
have had a massive war-chest, nor could it have been loyalty to Nero which drove them, for they 
immediately tried to proclaim Rufus emperor. It was simply fear and prejudice which gripped them and 
led to the destruction of Vindex's forces.349 This can perhaps be summed up best by the fact that the 
Rhine legions were now calling the Gauls enemies rather than allies.350 
Nero's reign saw a change in the trajectory of Gallo-Romans. The other Julio-Claudians all had a 
strong connection with Gaul, in one way or another, and this usually resulted in benefits for at least the 
wealthy Gallo-Romans, whether that be citizenship, senate positions, or other means of climbing up in 
Roman society. Nero, however, focused his attention on the east and the only time Gaul came to 
prominence was to either tar it with an association with the Great Fire or to delegitimize the grievances 
of a Roman senator simply because he was a Gaul. Admittedly, Nero's involvement in these events is 
tangential but Roman Gaul never earned his attention in the way the east did. Yet despite the 
downward trend, most Gallo-Romans remained loyal to the empire, even Vindex. The ways in which this 
loyalty was repaid in the following two years would change Gaul for the next two centuries.  
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Year of Four Emperors 
The years following Vindex's defeat were rather tumultuous for Gaul, even compared to the 
other areas of the empire at the time.351 Roman Gaul suffered through the largess of some emperors, 
the pillaging of others, and a rebellion on their doorstep which came to involve some Gallic tribes. One 
would probably have expected a wider scope to the involvement in the latter and yet most of Gaul 
stayed loyal, or as loyal as possible when emperors were shifting every few months. The ways in which 
the Romans repaid this loyalty would thrust the Gauls onto the path they followed for two centuries. 
First, though, they had to make it through the Year of the Four Emperors. 
Despite the defeat and the loss of so many men, things began to look up for the tribes which 
had supported Vindex soon afterwards. Nero lost control not long later and Galba was offered the 
emperorship by the Senate. The new emperor did not forget that he owed his new position to Vindex's 
initiative and those tribes which had supported him were rewarded with grants of Roman citizenship, 
remissions of taxes, and land grants.352 Of course, these grants had to come from somewhere and the 
northern tribes such as the Treveri and Lingones, which had not supported Vindex, bore the brunt of the 
cost.353 Matters only became worse when A. Vitellius, commander of the lower German army, was 
declared emperor by his troops in opposition first to Galba and then to Otho when the latter overthrew 
the former. Those tribes which were on the marching paths of Vitellius' lieutenants were forced to 
provide supplies to the legions. Four thousand Gallo-Romans were slaughtered at Divodurum, the urban 
centre of the Mediomatrici, today's Metz, and settlements further along the path of march pleaded with 
the legions to spare them, not having rebelled at any point.354 The Helvetii in particular suffered harshly 
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as they had refused to recognize Vitellius.355 A poorly organized resistance by their tribe was swiftly put 
down with thousands dead or enslaved. The new emperor himself set a leisurely pace on his march to 
Italy and, in fact, had a prolonged stay in Lugdunum, where his expensive tastes were said to have done 
almost as much damage as his army's march.356 
The Three Gauls had been in a state of upheaval for nearly a year by this point and the strain 
was definitely showing. One particular incident shows just how frustrated the Gallic people were by this 
time. A Boian commoner named Mariccus declared himself a god and a liberator of the Gallic provinces 
and managed to attract a following of around 8000 people which plundered territory of the Aedui. 
Eventually, Aeduan militia and a few cohorts sent by Vitellius were able to stop the revolt. Mariccus 
himself was captured and later executed by Vitellius.357 Previous uprisings had always been led by 
members of the Gallic aristocracy but the Three Gauls were apparently so shaken by recent events that 
even a man such as Mariccus was able to gain a strong following.358 This revolt highlights the disruptions 
that were taking place in Roman Gaul at the time and the tenuous nature of any appearance of peace.  
 It was in this context that the final and by far most widespread rebellion of this period took 
place, that of Julius Civilis. He was from a similar pedigree as Vindex although his attitude differed 
greatly. Civilis was a prince of the Batavians, a Germanic tribe which had been settled in Gallo-Roman 
territory and provided auxiliary forces rather than tribute for the privilege.359 Tacitus claims that agents 
of Vespasian encouraged Civilis and his formidable Batavians to rebel in order to tie down some of 
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Vitellius' troops along the Rhine.360 However, it soon became clear that Civilis had his own motivations 
and goals for the rebellion.361 In addition to the Batavians and some German allies from across the 
Rhine, Civilis hoped to bring the Gallic provinces into his revolt.362 As such, Gallic auxiliary units which 
were captured or surrendered were treated very well and encouraged to join Civilis or if they chose not 
to were sent home with spoils from the Romans.363 Tacitus also claims that Civilis downplayed Vindex's 
disastrous defeat the previous year, saying that the Roman victory was due to German and Gallic 
support of the legions. Thus, according to Tacitus, Civilis was preparing an independent kingdom 
consisting of both Gallic and Germanic territories and was doing all he could to bring the Gauls onboard 
willingly.364 Despite these overtures, the Gallic communities remained very loyal to Rome at first. Gallic 
reinforcements continued to stream in to support the beleaguered and depleted legions stationed along 
the Rhine despite their inability to stop Civilis' revolt.365 This inability to halt Civilis strained and then 
finally broke the morale of the Rhine legions. With the Roman forces so dispirited, some Gallic tribes 
began to abandon the empire and instead joined forces with Civilis.  
 The leaders of the Gallic side of this revolt were Julius Classicus and Julius Tutor from the Treveri 
and Julius Sabinus from the Lingones, the same tribes which had suffered most under Galba's policies 
and had rallied to Vitellius' cause.366 Like Vindex and Civilis, these men bore names that pointed to an 
aristocratic background with ancestors who received Roman citizenship under Julius Caesar, Augustus or 
Tiberius at the latest. Both of the Treverans were commanders in the Roman military, probably in charge 
                                                          
360
 Tac. Hist. 4.13. Timpe (2005) claims that Tacitus is showcasing the blurring of lines between barbarian and 
Roman ideals with barbarian forces used in a Roman civil war. 
361
 Tac. Hist. 4.13; Civilis had already been falsely charged with rebellion and barely escaped execution. He may 
have thought that an actual rebellion could both protect and enrich him at Roman expense; see Drinkwater (1983) 
45. For a slightly different view see Cosme (2011) showing how Civilis may have been manipulated by Roman 
powers before the beginning of the revolt.  
362
 Dyson (1971) 264-5. 
363




 Tac. Hist. 4.25. Drinkwater (1983) 45-6 points out the noteworthiness of this loyalty shown by the Gallo-
Romans. 
366
 Tac. Hist. 4.55. Timpe (2005) sees the revolt of locally recruited auxiliary units as the biggest danger. 
75 
 
of units drawn from their own tribe. This turned out to be a serious problem for the Romans as the 
defection of these men and the forces under their influence led to the complete surrender of the legions 
along the Rhine who had been relying on local reinforcements to make up for their losses.367 Any doubt 
there may have been that these men were simply leading an anti-Vitellius movement among the Gauls 
was immediately shattered when they compelled the troops who were spared to swear allegiance to an 
Imperium Galliarum, a Gallic Empire.368 Unfortunately for the rebels, this stunning initial success would 
not last long. Julius Sabinus and his Lingonian militia were defeated by the Sequani, who had remained 
loyal to Rome. Sabinus himself went into hiding for nine years before he was located and executed.369 
Sabinus' defeat was a significant setback for the revolt but the bigger blow was yet to fall.  
The Gallic tribes came together in a grand conference at Reims to discuss what the policy of the 
Gallo-Romans should be regarding the rebellion. Tacitus says that Julius Valentinus led the delegation 
from the Treveri and was a fierce advocate for the war, calling to mind the usual arguments against 
empire and hurling insults upon the Romans.370 Julius Apex, a Remian, meanwhile was the advocate for 
the Romans, pointing out the loyalty they were owed and the danger now that the legions were nearly 
upon them. The position against the rebellion was further strengthened by infighting amongst the Gallic 
tribes over who would have prominence if they were successful in breaking away from Rome.371 Thus, 
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the joint decision was declared in the name of the Gallic provinces not to join the rebellion and to tell 
the Treveri and Lingones, who had determinedly not joined in the resolution, to stop their revolt.372 
 Although Tacitus highlights the petty infighting as the main reason the Gallo-Romans were won 
over to the Roman side, it is important to note that they did not join the Treveri and Lingones in revolt. 
Despite everything the Gallo-Romans had been subjected to over the previous year at the hands of the 
Romans, they chose to continue their loyalty to the empire. They even organized men to be sent to 
Cerealis, the general Vespasian sent to quell the rebellion. He turned them down, saying that the legions 
were sufficient to defend the empire.373 Which, to his credit, they were as he quickly defeated the bulk 
of the Gallic forces at Trier driving Classicus, Tutor, and Civilis out of Gaul itself.374 The rebellion was 
thereafter a very localized affair in Batavian territory before the ultimate surrender of Civilis. What 
happened to him and the other rebel leaders is unknown though it is probably safe to presume they 
were executed.  
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While the rebellions were at an end in Gaul, it was not the end for how the Gallic provinces were 
affected by them. The lasting effects would shape the Three Gauls for the next two hundred years. 
There does not seem to be any evidence that there was widespread destruction or retribution in general 
for those tribes which had joined the rebellion. Even Trier was spared from sacking by Cerealis after his 
victory there.375 It was the political ramifications of the rebellions which seem to have shaped Roman 
Gaul more than any superficial destruction or loss of property. The Gallo-Romans had learned that the 
Romans did not really consider them to be equals in the empire. Vindex was thought of as a Gaul who 
had led a Gallic rebellion against Rome rather than a senator who had tried to overthrow an unfit 
emperor. Their territory was subject to the whim of emperors like Galba who could take land when they 
needed to appease allies. Even when they refused to join the rebellion of Civilis and offered their 
support and troops, they were refused and told that the legions, i.e., the Romans, could defend the 
empire themselves. Tacitus himself said that this action showed the Gauls how despised they were (nam 
recepta iuventute facilius tributa toleravere, proniores ad officia quod spernebantur).376  
The Gallo-Romans had made great strides in Romanization since the conquest under Julius 
Caesar. Roman citizenship was very common among the aristocratic class377 and since Claudius' reforms 
there were even Gallo-Roman senators from the Three Gauls such as Vindex and his father. Yet they 
were never really fully accepted. As discussed in a previous chapter, Vindex's revolt could not be seen as 
a senatorial protest against a bad princeps, only as a Gallic dynast attempting to wrest control of Gaul 
from the Romans. Supporting Gallo-Roman forces were rejected by a commander who did not trust 
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them to remain loyal. The terror Gallicus, the Roman fear of the Gauls, was an ever-present detriment to 
Gallo-Roman relations and at this point the Gauls seem to have become fed up. After these years it is 
very difficult to find any senators or equestrians originating in the Three Gauls. Likewise, leading Gallo-
Romans no longer controlled the locally raised auxiliaries, increasingly these came under the command 
of Italian officers and, moreover, these tribal auxiliaries were now often sent away from their province 
of origin.378 Gallic aristocratic families continued to exist afterwards, they were not wiped out by the 
rebellions, although it is likely that there was a diminished male population among those tribes which 
supported the rebels (e.g., the Treveri, Lingones, etc.).379 It seems that the Gallo-Romans were actively 
rejecting a larger role in imperial politics from this point until the third century crisis, some two 
centuries later. They instead focused on local politics, leading their civitates and not straying beyond 
their tribal territories. It is not until the rise of another Imperium Galliarum in 260 CE that we see Gallo-
Romans becoming major players in imperial politics and that seems to be because imperial politics 
became local politics.380 A similar rise of Gallo-Romans to prominence can be seen during the tetrarchy 
and throughout the 4th century when Trier was repeatedly used as an imperial residence.381 In my view, 
this can all be traced to the events of 68-70 with the generations immediately following staying out of 
imperial politics due to what occurred and later generations simply following in the footsteps in their 
ancestors and staying out of imperial politics from tradition. That said, there may be other explanations 
as to why Gallo-Romans senators and equestrians are so difficult to find in the later 2nd and 3rd 
centuries and the rebellions of Vindex and Civilis may have only impacted the generation or two that 
came immediately afterwards.  
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Roman biases and prejudices managed to offend the Gallo-Romans enough that they caused a 
wholesale rejection of a role in imperial politics by the Gallo-Romans despite the social and financial 
benefits to becoming a senator or equestrian. In fact we know of only a handful of senators from Gaul 
(excluding the highly Romanized Narbonensis) during the first three centuries after the crisis of 68-70 CE 
who made up less than 5% of the Senate in the 2nd century.382 While Narbonensis produced dozens of 
senators, there are only 11 known with certainty to be from the Three Gauls in the first two centuries, 3 
in the first (including both Vindex and his father) and 8 in the second.383 While there is obviously an 
increase in the number of senators, the numbers are so small that it still paints the picture of how few 
Gallo-Romans made their way to the heights of imperial office, especially when one takes into account 
the increase in epigraphic materials in Gaul during the second century. With the wealth of epigraphic 
material available, the paltry number of senators from the Three Gauls is noteworthy, especially 
compared to those from Narbonensis. Also important to note is the lack of continuity amongst the 
senators; Settipani has done a great deal of work cataloguing the senatorial families but the Julii Gallo-
Romans cannot be found, despite their wealth and prominence within Gaul; there are no inscriptions 
featuring Julian Gaul senators or equestrians and they are absent from any lists of senators or consuls 
that are available.384 Likewise, even the work of Talbert, which covers so much of the workings of the 
Senate, has little to add on the lack of Gallic senators and Chastagnol's account on the origins of senate 
members similarly has little to say on the non-Narbonensian Gallic senators.385  
The example of Vindex shows that Gallo-Romans were willing and able to become senators 
under the Julio-Claudians, that is, they possessed the wealth and power necessary for the posts, yet only 
this small group took advantage of the opportunity. There is no evidence for Gallo-Romans being 
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excluded by official or unofficial policy so one would have to conclude that they chose not to join, 
perhaps due to the prejudices of the Romans. Gallo-Romans taking equestrian posts are likewise rare to 
find. Following Civilis' rebellion, auxiliary units and officers were not allowed to serve locally to hinder 
further rebellions and this seems to have convinced the Gallo-Romans to abandon military careers as 
well.386 Our one outstanding example, an anonymous Treveran (CIL xiii 4030 ) who served as an officer in 
either Britain or Lower Germany, reinforces the view of Gauls eschewing imperial politics. The 
inscription shows him holding the posts of flamen Augusti, flamen Leni Martis quinquennalis, praefectus 
cohort. Hispanorum equitatae, tribunus militum leg. VIIII Hispanae, praefectus equitum alae Augustae 
Vocontiorum. Instead of moving on to a procuratorship, this individual became a leading figure amongst 
his own tribe.387 The only imperial post that we have more evidence for is the religious posts tied to the 
altar outside Lugdunum and that can be seen as a high post within Roman Gaul rather than an imperial 
position.388 
Drinkwater makes the case that a historian must be careful not to read too much into the events 
of 68-70 CE.389 After all, the vast majority of the Gallo-Romans remained loyal to Rome in a time of great 
upheaval, and there is no evidence for direct retribution or a break in the acquisition of Roman material 
goods. While most scholars do not draw any connection between the decline in Gallo-Roman imperial 
service and the events of these years aside from the relocation of auxiliary forces away from their 
recruitment area, there does seem to be a connection between the events of 69-71 and the future of 
Roman Gaul. A closer analysis of the crisis at the end of Nero's reign, in combination with a look at the 
long-term effects would rather speak to the opposite: that this was the straw that broke the camel's 
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back for Gallo-Roman relations. There is such a sharp divide between the growth of Gallic influence 
before 68 and such a marked decline afterwards that the influence of the troubles of these years cannot 
be overstated. The Romans had demonstrated exactly what they thought of the Gauls and they, in turn, 





  It has likely come to attention that the druids have been conspicuously absent from the 
preceding chapters. This is because their evolution is easier to display when all the accounts are 
examined together.390 So having gone through the history of Roman Gaul from its conquest by Julius 
Caesar to the beginning of Vespasian's reign once, we will do so again, now with a particular focus on 
the druids and their intersections with and reactions to the Roman world. 
  Cicero is the first Roman we find writing about the druids but only in a passing mention. Yet the 
passage is quite positive, saying that the druid he had met was a learned man, well versed in natural 
philosophy and divination.391 This was Divitiacus, the Aeduan, who was discussed above in the chapter 
dealing with Caesar's conquest. He was hosted by Cicero's brother while in Rome.392 There are a few 
things to note here. First is that Cicero does not mention the political role that Divitiacus' visit was 
playing at the time. This is in contrast to Caesar, who only writes about Divitiacus' political role in Gaul 
and not that he was a druid.393 This would seem to say that a Gaul's role as druid and as an aristocrat 
were separate and need not have directly influenced each other - at least in the perception of the 
Roman nobility. The second matter to note is that Cicero does not mention human sacrifice when 
discussing what role druids played. He was both aware of, and disgusted by, the practice of human 
sacrifice amongst the Gauls yet he does not tie it to the druids here.394 It is unclear what should be made 
of this distinction, if anything, except perhaps that the druids were not necessarily perceived as being 
stained by the practice of human sacrifice amongst the Romans, even the highest echelons of the 
senate. 
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  Caesar is the Roman writer who provides the most detailed account we have of them from any 
source. While discussing the nature and structure of Gallic and Germanic societies395, Caesar claims that 
there are two leading classes in Gaul: the Druids and the knights.396 While the latter were the warlords 
and tribal chiefs whom Caesar most often dealt with, the former had control of all religious matters in 
Gaul. They served as the teachers of aristocratic youth whether they intended to become druids 
themselves or not. They served as mediators and judges for every type of conflict within Gaul and if 
someone was found to have been in the wrong, the druids had the power to ban him from all sacrifices, 
which essentially made them outlaws from Gallic society. These sacrifices could include human 
sacrifices, which the druids were also in charge of.397 Gallic youths would train for up to 20 years before 
they could be called druids, the length of the training being explained by the need to memorize all the 
druidic teachings. Caesar writes that the druids would not commit any of their teachings to writing both 
to ensure that they did not circulate amongst the masses and because having access to the written 
works would lessen their abilities to recall the information from memory. They would, however, use 
Greek letters to record more mundane matters and correspondences.398 Finally, Caesar states that the 
druids were headed by an archdruid whose position was sometimes contested by arms (although this 
somewhat contradicts his later statement that the druids do not go to war).399 In short, according to 
Caesar, the druids have a very prominent place in Gallic society and politics.  
  Yet the rest of Caesar's account of the war does not harmonize with his information on the 
druids. While Caesar deals with many Gallic aristocrats he does not mention druids in the rest of his 
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account of the war.400 One would think that during the Gallic councils which are called several times 
during the war, the mediating druids would have a central role, yet they are missing. Even Divitiacus, 
whom Cicero had identified as a druid, is only mentioned in his role as a leader of the Aedui. Caesar 
never calls him a druid, yet they must have known one another well, as Divitiacus was a strong 
supporter of Caesar. In fact, recalling the conflict between the Germans and the Gauls, Caesar mentions 
Divitiacus in the section directly preceding his description of the druids without connecting the two.401 
There is also a possibility that Divitiacus' brother, Dumnorix, was also a druid since one of the reasons he 
gave for not being able to accompany Caesar to Britain was religious obligations.402  
  The discrepancy may have occurred because Caesar wrote most of this section using 
information from earlier authors, most notably, Posidonius.403 While the latter's writings have not 
survived, both Strabo and Diodorus Siculus mention him as a source and Caesar's account looks very 
much like a hastily written condensation of some of his passages. The simplifications in Caesar's account 
(mostly failing to mention the other two intellectual classes among the Celts) are easily explained by the 
difficult circumstances under which he was writing and that he was more concerned with justifying his 
actions to the senate than providing an entirely accurate picture.404 This would mean that the political 
influence actually possessed by the druids was far more minimal than Caesar's description implies, 
which fits the rest of his narrative since the druids are completely absent from it.  
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  After Caesar, the accounts of the druids become far more spotty despite the fact that authors 
would have much greater access now that Gaul was part of the Roman empire. This probably reflects 
the decline of the druids in both numbers and influence brought about by the Romans' policies and their 
general presence.405 From Suetonius, we learn that Augustus banned Roman citizens from the "religion 
of the druids," which would have been a death knell for them even if other prohibitions had not been 
placed.406 Those who were most likely to become druids were the young nobles but they were also the 
most likely to attain Roman citizenship, either through military service or through their fathers. Since 
there were so many benefits to becoming a Roman citizen the incentives were tipped away from the 
druids. Compounding this was the founding of several Roman schools throughout Gaul as part of 
Augustus' program of Romanization, the largest of which was set up in 12 BCE at Augustodunum.407 This 
centre of Roman teaching would become so important that Florus targeted the city during his rebellion 
in order to secure Gallic youths from across the provinces.408 With so many Gallic youths being taught in 
the Roman manner, it could only have weakened the influence of the druids since they would, naturally 
have fewer adherents.  
  The next emperor to pass legislation against the druids was Tiberius, at least, according to Pliny 
the Elder. He states that Tiberius put down the druids and that their few remaining adherents fled to 
Britain where local cults were still practised.409 This would raise the intriguing possibility that Tiberius 
passed this legislation either before the revolt of Florus and Sacrovir, perhaps giving religious reasons for 
the revolt as well as financial, or that it was passed afterwards since the druids were viewed as an anti-
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Roman element.410 The slightly less charitable conclusion is that Pliny was mistaken in saying it was 
Tiberius who passed this legislation rather than Claudius.411 It is Suetonius who says that in 54 CE 
Claudius was the emperor who abolished the religion of the druids in the same passage mentioning 
Augustus' prohibition on Roman citizens practicing it.412 Again, the timing would be interesting here as 
Claudius also was the one who admitted Gallo-Romans from Gallia Comata to the Senate in 47 CE.413 
There is no mention of druidic concerns when admitting such men to the senate despite a large 
contingent being against the admittance of the Gallo-Romans at all. It is possible that this is again a sign 
of their diminished importance since their anti-Roman stance did not even warrant a mention.414 One 
should also note that these measures clearly all failed to stop the druids completely as Tacitus mentions 
the druids being involved with Civilis' rebellion415 and there remains scattered references to druids all 
the way to the 4th century CE.416 How the druids managed to hold on shows what a powerful influence 
Roman prejudices could have on Roman Gaul. 
  There is a noticeable distinction between the accounts of Romans and those living within the 
Roman empire in the first century BCE and the first century CE. The earlier accounts all contained 
sections which read as condemnations, almost entirely centred around the practice of human sacrifice 
and the druids' involvement in it.417 Yet aside from this instance, for the most part they remain objective 
recorders of what functions the druids served. It is in the writers of the first century CE that we see 
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special venom towards the druids in general.418 Tacitus calls their sacrifices saevus;419 to Lucan their 
ceremonies are barbaric;420 when Mela says the Gauls still possess some of their former savagry he next 
writes of the druids;421 for Suetonius the religion of the druids is barbarous and inhuman;422 finally, Pliny, 
whom one would think would be more sympathetic to the druids due to his fascination with both 
medicine and magic and his attribution of these roles to the druids, declares at the end of his section on 
druids that one can hardly realise how much they owe to the Romans for sweeping away the monstrous 
conditions where killing and even eating people was the highest religious observance.423 These are all 
incredibly damning attitudes taken towards the druids as a whole rather than focusing on the one rite 
they do not condone. One can easily see a self reinforcing circle where the druids resist Romanization 
which led to them being seen as disruptive elements and described in harsh terms which fuelled even 
more resistance from the druids and so on. Yet this would not have happened so readily had the druids 
retained their hold on upper Gallo-Roman society, but as we have seen, that hold was greatly reduced 
by the legislative efforts of the emperors. Indeed, every time they emerge into the main narrative of 
history, they are actively working against the Roman authorities. Both of these instances are from 
Tacitus, first the druids on the island of Anglesey taking part in a battle against the Roman forces 
invading the island424 and again in 70 CE when druids prophesied that the fire in Rome was a sign that 
the peoples beyond the Alps would come to rule the world.425 In both cases the druids were taking part 
in armed resistance to Rome and are named as the chief instigators of the movements. Clearly they 
were acting to re-establish their positions in the Gallic world and the only way they thought that could 
happen was to oust the Romans. Which was probably true. With their traditional roles denied to them, 
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the druids changed themselves as can be seen in the other main shift in first century CE descriptions, the 
emphasis of groves. 
  When modern people think of druids, the image that usually comes to mind is of robed men 
performing secret rites in groves and other secret natural places but this was far from the historical 
truth, at least before Gaul was conquered by Rome.426 Afterwards, almost every source mentions some 
connection between the druids and groves. The most direct, and most famous, account relating druids 
to groves comes from Pliny who claims that druids do not perform any rites away from the foliage of 
their sacred oak groves. He mentions this in connection to a bizarre ritual to harvest mistletoe from a 
sacred oak that involves a golden cutting tool, bulls, and the full moon.427 The emphasis in Pliny's work is 
definitely on the magical and/or medicinal with the teaching and political roles of the druids nowhere to 
be found.428 Lucan writes of the druids living in deep groves and uninhabited woods429 and Mela notes 
that they teach in remote, sequestered places such as groves or caves.430 Lastly, Tacitus mentions groves 
used for sacred rites on the island of Anglesey, which was attacked by Suetonius Paulinus before 61 CE. 
Since the Romans are confronted by an army that included druids, it is reasonable to conclude that 
these groves were sacred to them.431 Where did this grove affinity come from if the earlier sources do 
not mention it at all? There are certainly some examples of sacred trees in Celtic religions but they may 
be no more important than sacred trees in any other Mediterranean cults.432 Oaks, after all, are sacred 
in quite a few religions. While it is possible that a sort of folk etymology came into play regarding the 
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druids and the similarity with the Greek word for trees, the other possibility is that the druids actually 
did migrate to these groves after the conquest of Gaul.433 With legislation being enacted against them, 
the druids were forced into hiding and secrecy in order to survive. All the passages that connect the 
druids to groves also highlight the secrecy of these places. The only times they emerge are when they 
are directly threatened or see a chance to drive the Romans out.  
  Thus we have the full transformation of the druids under the Julio-Claudians from aristocratic 
men prominent in both religion and politics to backwoods hermits eking out an existence along the 
fringes of Gallo-Roman society, only occasionally venturing into the spotlight when things look the most 
dire for Rome and then we cannot fully trust our sources as accurate. Even this resistance seems to have 
petered out after the first century as there is no mention of druidic inspired uprisings or attempted 
uprisings during, for example, the third century crisis, a point when Rome was far weaker than any time 
under the Julio-Caudians. As with Roman Gaul as a whole, the druids adapted rather than dying out and 
managed to survive, albeit in a diminished capacity, at least until the Christians took over the empire. 
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 At the end of our examination, we can now answer the questions posed at the start: what were 
the Gallo-Roman attitudes towards the Romans and how did Roman prejudice shape the history of 
Roman Gaul? The short answers are: mixed and negatively. It is interesting to note that Roman attitudes 
on the Gallo-Romans changed relatively little throughout the period we scrutinized. The prejudice and 
terror seemed to always be there, if not in the open then always lurking behind various decisions and 
policies. Some, such as Claudius, could rise above this stereotyping view and argue for greater inclusion 
of the Gallo-Romans in the empire but for many the image of the barbarous Gauls seemed to take 
centre stage. The contrast was the Gallo-Romans who, once brought under the control of the empire, 
embraced Romanization whole-heartedly. The problem was that they were not embraced in turn by the 
Roman establishment. A quick recap of what occurred is useful here.  
 Under Caesar, opinions on the Romans were quite obviously split in Gallic society. Divitiacus 
represented the pro-Roman side while his brother, Dumnorix, was a leading anti-Roman Gaul. The fact 
that opinions over the Romans could be split not only amongst the Gauls as a whole or even within a 
tribe but between siblings showed that there was no overarching Gallic policy towards the Romans. One 
cannot say that "the Gauls" as a group held any opinion on the Romans. Instead, each tribe and noble 
would support or oppose the Romans as they saw fit, looking out for their own self interest. As time 
went on, with more and more of Gaul falling into Caesar's hands, resistance became a more universal 
sentiment. Under Vercingetorix, the Gauls achieved a unity unseen for as long as the Romans had been 
fighting them. The Romans had helped bring the Gauls together and while the revolt ultimately failed, it 
forged a shared identity that Augustus would use to craft his own form of Gallic unity. 
 While Caesar had fought to bring Gaul under his control, Augustus worked to make them part of 
the empire, not just a subject people or the personal holdings of one man. The colonies, the new Gallic 
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cities, the roads, the citizenship grants, and the altar all brought the Gauls into the Roman fold. 
Furthermore, these initiatives served to unite Gaul. The roads allowed easier movement and 
communication, the cities became populations hubs, larger than any others that had previously existed 
in Gaul, and the altar and the council surrounding it gave a collective voice for the Gallo-Romans, not 
just as individual tribes but as a whole. Romanization spread throughout the Gallic provinces and 
ensured the loyalty of the new Gallo-Romans despite Augustus' setbacks with the Germans.  
 Tiberius freed the Gallo-Romans from the expenses of imperial princes and Germanic 
campaigns, allowing them to grow and enjoy the peace and prosperity of the empire. Some, particularly 
the lower classes, were clearly not faring as well which allowed for the revolt of Florus and Sacrovir. Yet 
the failure of their rebellion shows how widespread Romanization had become within Gaul. Few of the 
nobility joined and the entire event seems to have been largely forgotten by later emperors. Caligula's 
visit put the wealth of the Gauls on display and his auction of the imperial household goods granted 
them a new level of prestige. Claudius furthered this with his numerous grants of citizenship, rewarding 
cities with colonial status, and eventually even allowing Gauls to join the senate. There was a clear 
upward trajectory for the Gauls from Caesar through Claudius, even under Tiberius who largely ignored 
the territory. The Romans still displayed their prejudice in the panic at the revolt or the arguments 
against inclusion of the Gallo-Romans into the senate but the wealth and relative placidity of Roman 
Gaul seems to have kept such expressions to a minimum. The terror Gallicus was not ruling over Gallo-
Roman relations under most of the Julio-Claudians.  
 The shift occurred under Nero, though the emperor himself bears little blame for what 
happened. The Great Fire of Rome brought the memory of the sack of Rome back to the forefront for 
the Romans. When Vindex raised his rebellion against Nero, he was not treated as a Roman senator 
resisting a tyrannical emperor, as his patron Galba was, but as a Gallic warlord, intent on carving out his 
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own kingdom in Gaul despite all evidence to the contrary. The destruction of his forces by 
uncontrollable Roman legions, coupled with the grants of Galba and the excesses of Vitellius would have 
provided compelling reasons for the Gallo-Romans to rebel during the year of the four emperors, 
especially since the empire was in chaos. But despite this, Civilis was only able to convince two tribes to 
join his rebellion, powerful ones to be sure, but a paltry showing overall. The rebels even used overt 
Roman iconography for their revolt, dressing in imperial purple to signify their leadership. Meanwhile, 
the rest of Gaul actively rejected the revolt, holding a council to cast a vote formally and tell the Treveri 
and Lingones to end their rebellion. Still, they were not treated as the loyal provincials they were and 
Cerealis rejected their offers of aid and dealt with the rebellion himself.  
 The druids, meanwhile, had been driven from their traditional roles in Gallic society and 
retreated to the groves and caves that they would become famous for. Romanization had progressed so 
much that the druidic teachings were no longer accepted. Legislation passed against the druids only 
sped up the process and by the time of Nero's death, they had all but disappeared from mainstream 
Gallic society. 
 Throughout the early empire, the Gallo-Romans made every effort to integrate themselves with 
the Roman empire. They served in the army, they became Roman citizens, they used their wealth to 
support the emperors, they bought imperial items to further their prestige, and finally, they became 
senators. Yet despite this upward climb in the first century of their subjugation under Rome, Gallo-
Romans do not constitute a major faction in later imperial politics. There are few Gallic senators and 
most of those, such as Vindex and his father, are from the short window between Claudius' raising of 
the Gallo-Romans to the senate and Nero's death. Even lower imperial postings for equestrians show 
little Gallic involvement. Those few exceptions, such as the priestly positions at the altar outside 
Lugdunum, are decidedly local imperial positions and have more to do with Gaul than Rome as a whole. 
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The handful of exceptions show that imperial posts were still open to Gallo-Romans, yet they were not 
flocking to fill them. Roman prejudice, which had tainted Gallo-Roman relations from the start and was 
made nakedly clear during the rebellions of 69-71 CE, had discouraged the Gallo-Romans from further 
involvement in larger imperial politics. Instead, they focused on local affairs, rarely straying far from 
their homeland and becoming the sort of quiet provincials that merit few mentions in the historical 
record from 71 to 260 CE. That shift still did not change the nature of Gallo-Roman politics but merely 
shifted the centres of power.   
 The state of affairs only changed in 260 CE due to the weakness of the empire and even here, it 
was more of a breakaway Roman empire than a Gallic nation. When the emperor Valerian was captured 
in 260 CE by the Persian shah, the weakness of the empire proved too much for the western provinces. 
They had been routinely stripped of their best soldiers in order to confront the growing Persian threat as 
well as the Gothic incursions, leaving Gaul exposed to the new German federations. The governor of 
Lower Germany, Postumus, was declared emperor by his troops and in a twist on the usual story of the 
third century, did not march on Rome but instead forged his own breakaway empire centred on Gaul, 
Spain, and Britain. The new empire had all the trappings of Rome: an emperor, a Caesar, a senate and 
did not revert to the tribal structure of pre-Conquest Gaul. For all intents and purposes it was simply 
another Roman empire, but centred on Trier rather than Rome, much like the later eastern Roman 
empire was still Roman but centred on Constantinople. The Gallo-Romans would fill the ranks of these 
institutions, possibly including the emperorship, that were needed to run the new empire but these 
could still be considered local positions. It is simply that the empire came to the Gallo-Romans rather 
than the other way around. Furthermore, once Rome reasserted its authority and power over the 
breakaway state, Gaul once again became a willing member of the Roman empire. They had not wanted 
to escape Rome, merely to keep out the invading Germans, which the central government had ignored 
in light of Gothic and Persian threats. After 275 CE, when the emperor Aurelian brought Gaul back into 
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the empire, there were no further revolts from that region by natives, only usurping generals and 
Germanic invaders.  
 Gaul's relationship with Rome was complicated but as shown, they attempted to embrace the 
Roman way of life once it became clear they would not be able to keep Rome out. The struggles over 
exactly what that relationship would be took the entire period of the Julio-Claudian emperors to work 
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